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SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

PARTS 4 AND 5

OCTOBER 31, 1973; NOVEMBER 20 AND 21, 1974

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⁴ Elected to subcommittee March 27, 1974.

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
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SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

Part 4

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1973

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, in executive session, at 10 a.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FASCELL. The serious crises in the Near East last week has shown all of us the fragility of the new spirit of détente which is said to characterize our relations with the Soviet Union. Last week's events also recalled for many of us memories of the grave Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and thus dramatically underscored the potential which Soviet involvement in Cuba has for sparking another serious confrontation between the major powers at some point in the future.

Since 1962 the Soviets have vastly increased their investment in Cuba, both militarily and economically. They have poured literally billions of rubles and thousands of hours of technical aid into Cuba to prop up its sagging economy. The Soviet Union has done all this, not from kindness, but to advance their own strategic and political position. To the Soviet Union, Cuba remains simply a pawn in its worldwide competition with the United States; a pawn whose worth may be diminishing in an era when strategic weapons technology has made a Cuban base unnecessary and when considerations of détente may find Cuba a bargaining chip most valuable only if traded away.

Soviet involvement in Cuba has often been overshadowed by more dramatic events elsewhere but it remains and should remain a matter of the deepest concern to this Government. In 1970, only 3 years ago, Soviet efforts to expand their naval facilities in Cuba provoked a dramatic warning to the Soviet Union by the President. As long as the Soviets remain heavily involved militarily on the island the potential will remain for the repetition of this kind of a crisis which, as Secretary Kissinger pointed out only last week, is not in the overall interests of the United States, the Soviet Union or mankind as a whole.

While I hope that one day we will be able to end this series of hearings on "Soviet Activities in Cuba," that day has not yet come and it is incumbent on this subcommittee that we continue to keep ourselves appraised of developments relating to Cuba. This morning we are pleased to again welcome to the subcommittee a very able briefing team from the Defense Intelligence Agency whose cooperation in providing information within its area of responsibility has always been

outstanding. Our witnesses are: Rear Adm. Donald B. Whitmire, Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence; Comdr. David B. Eldridge, Jr., analyst; and Mr. Paul F. Wallner, analyst.

We know everything here is classified and we will treat it accordingly. Then we will get with you on declassifying whatever seems to be sensible and reasonable.

Admiral, do you have a presentation?

Admiral WHITMIRE. Yes, sir, I do.

Mr. FASCELL. Then start out.

**STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. DONALD B. WHITMIRE, U.S. NAVY
ASSISTANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

Admiral WHITMIRE. Mr. Chairman, I am the Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Vice Admiral De Poix, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, has asked me to express his regret on being unable to be present at the hearing this morning.

We are here to update you on developments concerning Soviet naval activities in Cuban waters; Soviet military and economic aid to Cuba; Cuban export of revolution; and other developments in Latin America. Since our presentation to your subcommittee last year, there have been two additional Soviet naval deployments to Cuba, and the Soviet Union has continued its program of military and economic assistance to the Castro government.

Fidel Castro has persisted in providing support to insurgent and terrorist groups in Latin America, although the level of his support continues to decline. Changes of governments in Chile and Argentina during the past year reflect the dynamic political forces at work in the hemisphere. I'd like to assure you that we in the Defense Intelligence Agency recognize the importance of developments in this area and keep close watch on activities in Latin America.

I have two analysts with me to present a detailed briefing on these developments. Commander Eldridge will discuss Soviet naval activities in Cuban waters. Mr. Wallner, who has appeared before your subcommittee previously, will review activities in Cuba, Castro's support of insurgency, and activities in other Latin American countries. Our presentation will follow the general outline of the briefing given you last year, with additional summaries on Chile and Argentina.

Also with me this morning as backup analysts are Lieutenant Smith on the Soviet Navy, and Lieutenant Litsinger on Chile and Argentina.

The overall classification of this briefing is secret, but we are prepared to sanitize the transcript so that it may be published in the open records if you so desire. With your permission, we will proceed with the briefing.

Commander Eldridge will begin with a discussion of Soviet air and naval deployments.

**STATEMENT OF COMDR. DAVID B. ELDRIDGE, JR., U.S. NAVY,
ANALYST, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

Commander ELDRIDGE. As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, Soviet naval deployments to Cuba commenced during the summer of 1969.

They had just completed their eighth deployment when we last briefed this subcommittee. The first eight deployments occurred from July 1969 to May 1972. There were several significant developments during these deployments. Of particular importance was the introduction of a nuclear-powered submarine on the first deployment, construction on Alcatraz Island on the third deployment, and the introduction of a ballistic missile submarine in the Caribbean during the eighth deployment. This is the first time a Soviet ballistic missile submarine has ever visited a port outside of the Soviet Union.

The Soviets have conducted their 9th and 10th deployments since we last appeared before this subcommittee. The ninth visit commenced in early December 1972 and consisted of a guided-missile light cruiser, a guided-missile destroyer, a nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine, a diesel attack submarine, a merchant tanker, an intelligence collector, and a subtender. Again you will note the presence of a nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine. All of the units except the subtender proceeded directly to the port of Cienfuegos. The Echo-II cruise-missile submarine remained in Cienfuegos until departing Cuban waters in early January. A submarine tender, which had deployed independently on a midshipman cruise to South America, entered the Caribbean after making a port visit to Rio de Janeiro. The tender entered Cienfuegos in early January where it remained until departing the Caribbean in mid-January. She did not participate with any of the other units while in the Caribbean. The remaining units, after conducting combined ASW exercises with the Cubans, departed the area in February.

The 10th deployment commenced in early August and consisted of a guided-missile light cruiser, a guided-missile destroyer, a merchant tanker, a nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine, and a diesel-powered attack submarine.

You will note again that a nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine was with the group. This is also the first time that a Kresta-II class guided-missile light cruiser has visited the Caribbean. This cruiser is one of the newest combatants in the Soviet Navy. She has improved ASW capabilities and is armed with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. All the units first visited Havana, and then circumnavigated the Gulf of Mexico. They then proceeded to Cienfuegos. A Foxtrot diesel-attack submarine joined the group in Cienfuegos. This submarine had apparently transited from the North Atlantic while the group was circumnavigating the Gulf of Mexico. During this deployment the E-II submarine was involved in an accident. The submarine may have collided with the light cruiser, as minor scars were noted on the cruiser's bow; however, it is also possible she may have hit a pier or a submerged coral reef. We are not sure what caused the damage. The submarine was observed with a hole in her port side near the bow and her pressure hull was apparently damaged. This was evidenced by the fact, that upon departing Cienfuegos she made a dive and then surfaced and completed her transit to the Soviet Union on the surface. The cruiser and a merchant tanker escorted the crippled submarine to the eastern Atlantic where they rendezvoused with an ocean rescue tug in the vicinity of the Azores. The tug escorted the crippled submarine back to the Northern Fleet, and the cruiser and tanker returned to Mariel. Meanwhile, the guided-missile destroyer and Foxtrot submarine made a transit to Mariel. These units

conducted combined ASW exercises with the Cubans throughout September and early October. During mid-October all four ships departed the Caribbean ending the Soviets' latest deployment.

The Soviets have also conducted air deployments to Cuba. When we last briefed you nine deployments had been completed. Since that time three additional deployments have been conducted. Their TU-95 Bear D naval reconnaissance aircraft fly from a northern fleet base to Havana's Jose Marti airport. These long-range aircraft probably perform reconnaissance and intelligence collection flights while en route to Cuba. While operating from Cuba, they have the opportunity for flying reconnaissance missions over U.S. forces transiting the Atlantic.

As previously briefed, the Soviets have provided themselves with a forward area facility on Alcatraz Island in Cienfuegos Harbor capable of extending their operations in the Caribbean. Construction took place during the summer of 1970, and no additional improvements have been observed.

Currently Soviet naval activity under way in Latin America consists of an Ugra class submarine tender conducting a midshipman cruise, visiting Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia. This ship was previously scheduled to visit Chile. However, this visit was canceled as a result of the Chilean coup. There is also a Soviet support ship now in Cienfuegos.

In summary, the Soviets continue to demonstrate their naval presence in the Western Hemisphere, and are gaining added experience in operating in remote location with limited support. A stabilization in the presence of Soviet combatants in the Caribbean has been noted, however, during the last 3 years. It should be pointed out that the sophistication of the units deployed continues to improve.

An increase has been noted in the total Soviet presence in the Caribbean since 1969. This increase includes visits by space support ships, intelligence collectors, and hydrographic research units. The extensive Soviet-Cuban hydrographic research operation, initiated in 1971, is essentially complete. Some hydrographic effort has been noted since last year, but it is probably designed to monitor the rate of change in underwater conditions rather than to cover new areas.

In conclusion, the Soviets have continued to introduce some of their most modern combatants and weapons, including three types of submarines and two new surface combatants. [Security deletion.] Their primary objective seems to be to convince the Western Hemisphere and particularly the United States that the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico are now a normal Soviet operating area.

This is the end of my portion of the briefing, gentlemen.

Admiral WHITMIRE. Mr. Wallner will now discuss activities in Latin America.

STATEMENT OF PAUL F. WALLNER, ANALYST, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. WALLNER. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure for me to be back before you this morning, sir.

My part of the briefing this morning will cover Soviet aid to Cuba, Cuban military and political activities, developments in Chile and Argentina, and potential trouble areas elsewhere in Latin America.

Overall Soviet interests in Cuba have increased substantially since 1970. In the past year, we have seen a continuation of this trend in Soviet-Cuban relations. Concerning Soviet military aid, during 1973 we have seen the downward curve of what appear to be cyclical arms shipments to Cuba. If past patterns hold, we should see a slight decline in military deliveries in 1974, followed by a gradual increase in 1975.

Since we last appeared before the subcommittee, the Soviets have delivered [security deletion] OSA 1 class large guided-missile boats to Cuba. They arrived early this month and increase the total number of this class. [Security deletion.]

With Soviet support continuing at its present level, the Cubans are expected to gradually improve their military capabilities [security deletion]. The Cuban Armed Forces are trained, equipped, and deployed for defense of the island. We see no evidence of Soviet strategic or offensive systems being placed in Cuba. In addition, the Cubans have only limited air- and sea-lift capabilities.

Concerning the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo, the Cubans have constructed [security deletion] artillery positions and [security deletion] ammunition revetments near the base since midsummer. Although all of the positions have not yet been completed, [security deletion]. None of the positions are as yet occupied and we have seen no personnel or equipment increases in the Guantanamo vicinity. The Cubans, however, have recently stepped up their public comments on Guantanamo, possibly in reaction to the October 2 detention of a Cuban ship in the Panama Canal by Chilean legal action. Although previous indications of hostility against the base have not materialized, we are watching the situation closely. Should the positions be occupied and forces moved into the area, the threat to Guantanamo would be significantly increased. Castro will probably stop short of direct military action against Guantanamo at this time. He is likely, however, to renew his propaganda attacks against the U.S. presence there.

Meanwhile, Soviet aid to the Cuban economy continues at the rate of \$1 million to \$1.5 million per day. In addition, in December of last year, the Soviets granted the Cubans new financial arrangements. These arrangements deferred repayment of debt and interest until 1986, established a new line of credit for some \$370 million, and extended balance of trade payments through 1975. The Soviets continue to supply the bulk of Cuba's oil and gasoline, [security deletion]. Other aid has taken the form of materiel and technical expertise for the construction of military and industrial installations.

Overall Soviet financial assistance to Cuba climbed to an all time high [security deletion] in 1972. [Security deletion.] The increasing Soviet economic assistance emphasizes past failures of the Cuban economy and reflects Soviet determination to keep a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. The decreasing military aid probably means that the Soviets are content with the present status of the Cuban armed forces. [Security deletion.] The total number of Soviet military personnel on the island has remained constant since the mid-1960's. The number of Soviet advisers and technicians has, however, increased during the past several years.

Soviet assistance has recently been detected in a series of new internal procedures. [Security deletion.] Finally, an all-out effort to im-

prove economy and efficiency in business, military, and governmental organizations has been initiated by the party.

Fidel Castro's strongly pro-Soviet proclamation at the September 5 nonaligned conference in Algeria is the latest evidence of Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union. [Security deletion.] Despite open hostility by many participants, Castro praised Soviet support to the Cuban revolution and argued that other developing countries should pursue a similar course.

In Latin American relations, Castro has continued his anti-U.S. and anti-OAS statements. In a recent speech, he called on the United States to end the economic blockade and to stop interfering in Latin American affairs. Castro has also stated that the OAS is a U.S. tool which should be restructured into a regional group excluding the United States. Diplomatic relations with Argentina, Guyana, Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago have been restored or established since we last appeared before this subcommittee. Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama are leaning towards renewed relations with the Castro government but uncertainty over the situation in Chile and the junta's prompt severance of relations with Cuba could cause delays. Cuba has stepped up trade and financial agreements with several Latin American nations recently, an action which is likely to enhance regional acceptance of the Castro government.

The U.S.S.R.'s military and economic support to Cuba is believed to be part of an international effort to expand their influence at U.S. expense. Towards this end, they seem determined to sustain the Cuban economy and military establishment and to continue air and naval deployments to Cuba. [Security deletion.] Political setbacks in various Latin American countries—most recently Chile—have made the Soviets extremely cautious in this regard.

Turning to Cuban export of revolution, we have seen a continuation of decreasing Cuban support to Latin American insurgents since our last appearance before this subcommittee. [Security deletion.]

Cuban support to revolutionaries in the Dominican Republic reached a climax in March when exiled Dominican Col. Francisco Caamano and a small band of insurgents landed on the south coast of the Dominican Republic. [Security deletion.] All of the insurgents were gradually captured or eliminated over a period of several weeks.

In Brazil, Cuban support to insurgents has been limited to propaganda attacks against the Medici administration, [security deletion]. Castro supported [security deletion] subversives in Argentina until the military regime of General Lanusse stepped down on May 25. Although Argentina has since reestablished diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba, former dictator and newly elected President Juan Peron has issued a decree outlawing Marxism and Castro can be expected to tread softly with respect to future support.

Until the military coup in Chile last month, Cuba provided some support to Chilean leftists consisting of arms, subversive training, and advisers in insurgency. One of the military junta's first official acts was to sever relations with Cuba and expel the considerable Cuban embassy staff. [Security deletion.]

At the present time, none of the revolutionary groups which received Cuban support during the past year constitute a serious threat to existing governments.

The most dramatic event in Latin America during the past year was the September 11 military coup in Chile. Conservative Army Commander General Augusto Pinochet, [security deletion] has been installed as junta president.

Pinochet had held the view that the military had no role in politics, [security deletion] he agreed not to interfere in the coup. [Security deletion.]

Air Force Gen. and ultraconservative Gustavo Leigh is the second most powerful junta member. [Security deletion.]

Navy Commander, Adm. Jose Merino, [security deletion] initiated the take-over in the port of Valparaiso. Since the coup, Merino has concentrated on economic problems. Although conservative, Merino has generally backed the more moderate Pinochet.

Carabinero Chief, Gen. Cesar Mendoza, the fourth junta member, was appointed national police chief during the coup. [Security deletion.]

The coup was precipitated by a series of military and government actions which are now known to have begun more than a year ago. [Security deletion.] Transportation strikes in October 1972 persuaded Allende to ask the military to enter the cabinet, a move they reluctantly accepted since it placed them in the position of enforcing policies they did not support.

Despite continued economic deterioration, Allende dismissed the military from the cabinet after he substantially increased his coalition's position in the March 1973 elections. During early summer, coup plotting renewed among junior army officers and was followed by the abortive June 29 coup attempt by an armored unit in Santiago. This was followed by Allende moves which pushed the military to the breaking point. Allende's tacit approval for his supporters to arm themselves, after giving the military power to seize illegal arms in October 1972, as well as his acquiescence to extremist seizures of industrial plants, served to solidify military opposition.

The crowning blow was Allende's effort to exploit the military for personal political gain. While asking the military to reenter the cabinet to alleviate the economic crisis, Allende gave them no real power in economic policy. This further alienated the military and provided the final impetus for the coup.

Until mid-August their apolitical tradition, the fear of civil war, radicalization within the military, and economic and political inexperience had deterred the military from moving against the Allende government. With the resignation of Army chief and former Interior Minister, Gen. Carlos Prats on August 24, [security deletion]. In the days preceding the coup, Allende disregarded warnings from many quarters that the military was prepared to move against him if he did not alter course. [Security deletion.]

We believe Allende was aware of the evidence of a coup, but apparently misjudged the military's determination and felt he could again out maneuver them. Ultimately, it was this error in judgment that brought about his downfall.

Cuban influence in Chile has been well documented for several years. Castro and Allende were personal friends and Castro used this friendship to enhance his political sway in Chile. As the internal

situation deteriorated, however, Allende disregarded Castro's advice to consolidate his gains and eliminate the opposition. Cuban support to Chilean terrorists included training in Cuba and Chile, provision of security and insurgency advisers, and arms shipments reported as late as January of this year. [Security deletion.]

Cuban support was aimed at the radical Chilean elements, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, and the Socialist Party. Castro viewed these groups as the most likely to advance his political views. The Soviets, however, tended to back the more moderate Communist Party. [Security deletion.] The Soviets were either unable or unwilling to supply the enormous financial aid Allende requested and although the Soviets most likely knew of Cuban involvement, there is no evidence of Soviet efforts to either curtail or support Castro's moves.

The junta has set objectives for the rebuilding of Chile. In the economic field, the junta has stated that Allende's policies will not be drastically reversed. Nationalized businesses will remain under government control, but subsidies will cease. More equitable repayment for nationalized industries is under discussion and the junta has ordered employers to honor the generous labor contracts earned under Allende.

On the political front, the junta has declared the Communist and Socialist Parties illegal. All legislative bodies have been dissolved and the remaining political parties recessed. A new constitution is being drafted [security deletion].

The third general goal is to eliminate terrorism. Under Allende, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, the largest and best equipped insurgent group in Chile was able to obtain large amounts of arms. [Security deletion.]

Major problems confront the junta in the immediate future. Despite military success in apprehending many terrorists, their structure remains basically intact and a significant threat. Allende supporters must now be convinced to support the junta and be assured that political surges will not take place.

On the economic side, foreign credits have been pledged by various nations, [security deletion] and Chile needs funds to purchase sorely needed food and fuel supplies as well as to alleviate the massive debts left by Allende. The junta's chance of success is difficult to predict, but it has generally restored order and has made initial moves to slow inflation and bolster the country's financial reserves.

We believe that the military's apolitical tradition and the historical preference for democratically elected governments augur against prolonged military rule. However, the military is ruling on a day-to-day basis. [Security deletion.]

Juan Peron's return to power highlighted the year in Argentina. His personal candidate in the March election, Hector Campora, garnered 49 percent of the vote. When Campora stepped down in favor of Peron in July, Peron's path to the presidency was assured. He got 62 percent of the vote in the September special election amidst an unstable political situation. The 78-year-old Peron is expected to make broad reforms in the political and economic fields.

Despite his popular mandate, Peron faces serious difficulties. Unemployment and low wages are the most pressing economic problems.

Much of his support comes from labor. [Security deletion.] In addition, the Peronist movement is fragmented into extreme left and right elements. Peron's declared war on Marxism has pushed some leftist groups into opposition. [Security deletion.]

The most demanding problem is terrorism. The People's Revolutionary Army and extreme left groups within the Peronist movement will attempt to force the government toward a more radical course. [Security deletion.]

Elsewhere in Latin America, scheduled presidential elections in Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Venezuela and Colombia raise the potential for political violence during the coming year.

In Venezuela, internal and external economic policies are focal points for the two principal parties. Both groups [security deletion] are concentrating on the rising cost of living and the availability of basic consumer items.

Primary issues in Colombia, are the border dispute with Venezuela, [security deletion] and economic development. Candidates from the three main parties have been selected. [Security deletion.]

In Guatemala, the principal issues are economic and social policies. The government's candidate, the personal choice of President Arana, [security deletion].

In the Dominican Republic, social and economic reforms seem to be major problems. In the final analysis, however, the key point will be political power. [Security deletion.]

In addition to Argentina and Chile, insurgent elements in Mexico and Guatemala could present more serious threats [security deletion]. These groups are striving to overthrow the government so that radical social and economic reforms can be implemented. They lack a base of popular support, however, and their actions are a source of embarrassment to the government rather than a threat. Tactics employed include ambushes of army patrols, kidnappings, and assassinations of businessmen and government officials.

Guatemalan insurgents, although disorganized and factionalized, [security deletion] could prove to be a disruptive force in Guatemala. [Security deletion.] The three insurgent groups have confined their activities to sporadic acts of terrorism and banditry. These groups will probably try to increase their activity during the campaign leading up to the presidential election next March.

Serious difficulties face many Latin American nations during the next several years. The Soviet presence in Cuba and Castro's reaction to increasing Soviet influence bear close scrutiny. Cuba's role in the hemisphere has taken on new significance as nationalism and independent action become increasingly important elements in the foreign policies of many countries.

The changes in Chile and Argentina portend major revisions in their internal and external affairs. Finally the potential for instability caused by diverse political forces exists in several other countries of the region. With these factors at work, the course of U.S. relationships with Latin America for the next few years promises to be extremely challenging. This concludes my portion of the briefing.

Admiral WHITMIRE. Mr. Chairman, this concludes our formal presentation. We will try to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Admiral.

I have a few questions.

Commander, what is your estimate on Guantanamo? Is it neutralized to the point it has no military value for the United States and is a liability for the Navy? And is it now just a political issue?

Commander ELDRIDGE. It still serves as a very useful base for our operations down there. It has deep water for submarine exercises and we use it extensively for shakedown cruises, ships coming out of repair, and indoctrinating crews.

Mr. FASCELL. What I have learned from the operational people is that Guantanamo is a training base which we keep alive because we do not have guts enough to close it.

Commander ELDRIDGE. We had the same capabilities in Puerto Rico but—

Mr. FASCELL. If you were an aircraft carrier commander would you take her into Guantanamo?

Commander ELDRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. You would?

Commander ELDRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. I suppose if you were ordered to you would. I would worry about it.

Well, that is interesting. How many men do we have there, Admiral?

Admiral WHITMIRE. We have about 5,800 total people. That includes all the U.S. personnel. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. They just ride the perimeter fence, don't they?

Admiral WHITMIRE. That is about the extent of that. [Security deletion.]

Another thing I think is important, the utility of this base at Guantanamo. [Security deletion.] This is a little out of our element but that is my personal view.

Mr. FASCELL. I was putting it on a personal basis since I know the operational questions are really not yours, and I am going to have to get with the Navy on it.

I have a feeling—and this is a personal feeling—we are playing games with Guantanamo and I am not sure that is smart. I don't know where it stands in the Joint Chiefs of Staff but I bet it is not even counted on in contingency planning. That is just a guess on my part.

We closed down Key West. We have nothing at Guantanamo and we rely on Puerto Rico. If you look at the water there, as a Navy man, I think you might have to get upset. Part of this has to do with my parochial view. I think that they made a mistake when they shut down the base at Key West but that is done and over with now.

But my interest in Guantanamo is not parochial. I think we have to make a hard decision there because we are hung up on the political question. With respect to Guantanamo, it seems to me that if we had the right kind of trade going, Guantanamo would not be an obstacle. It would not preclude some kind of arrangements. That is what I gather although nobody ever came out and said it.

I get the impression [security deletion] that it would not take them very long to neutralize that base to the point of being unable to use it in any fashion unless you are going to knock out the Cuban military, [security deletion].

Admiral WHITMIRE. We are watching that situation. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. We can guess at what they are doing and the guess might be bad, but obviously it may be a pressure point.

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. I was not concerned about that. What I am concerned about is what happens with the next step. Suppose we wake up tomorrow morning and in the night they stuck in all the artillery pieces. Now, we can do several things, like not saying anything and not reacting and forgetting it, but the fact is from a military standpoint Guantanamo is neutralized.

Now what do we do?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. That is the reason I think I ought to pursue this somewhere. The Joint Chiefs probably won't tell me but we will see what we can find out.

Based on Castro's speeches or other signs, do you believe that there has been any change in Cuban attitudes and Cuban policy?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir, it is a subtle change we tend to feel, and it is a change more into the Soviet camp than it has ever been before. He does not seem to be making any overt conciliations toward the United States. He has continued his anti-U.S. rhetoric and we believe that the situation in Latin America, in Chile specifically and in Argentina to a lesser degree, caused him to go back to the drawing board. He is going to have to reshape and rethink his role in the hemisphere and his role vis-a-vis the United States, because of these developments.

Mr. FASCELL. Don't you feel there is a change with a very definite effort on the part of establishing relations with other countries?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir, there is.

Mr. FASCELL. The Cubans welcome that and also Castro has come out and practically demanded an end to the economic blockade by the United States. Some people might take that as a hostile act but I could read that as "Let's do something, I am tired of this foolishness," and the Russians might be prodding him because it is costing them money.

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Are you aware of any moves by any high or mid-level officials in the Castro government such as sending out feelers in Latin America that they are ready to talk with the United States.

Mr. WALLNER. None other than what you mentioned, their relations with governments that they view as revolutionary.

Mr. FASCELL. I keep picking up rumors of this kind from responsible people who have been in contact with officials of the Castro government. Let's put it this way. I don't know what level they are, but the [security deletion] in Cuba, has reportedly said: "We are ready to talk. Let's start." But you guys don't have any such reports?

Admiral WHITMIRE. Not to our knowledge.

Mr. FASCELL. This statement allegedly took place at a meeting in Chile before the coup and the [security deletion] was in Cuba for a meeting of some kind and was not bashful about making the subject known. It looked like an ordinary open intelligence tender.

I don't know how to follow that up, or if we should. I have not told our political people yet but I think I have to now.

Mr. WALLNER. I would think so.

Mr. FASCELL. I was curious to see how you gentlemen evaluate the Cuban efforts to normalize their relations with the United States. In summary, you think it is subtle but that there is something going on?

Mr. WALLNER. That is right.

Mr. WHALEN. He thinks it is subtly away from the United States toward Cuba.

Mr. WALLNER. It seems to be more toward the Soviet camp. In the spirit of détente, if you can say that is away from the United States, I would not make that judgment.

Mr. WHALEN. I wondered if it is not possible that Cuba might feel that it is in her own interests not to reach a better understanding with the United States; rather, keep the wounds open and hopefully attract to her side the other countries in Latin America and in so doing isolate the United States.

Mr. WALLNER. They let it be known through their speeches this is what they are after. They come down hard claiming United States involvement in Latin America and U.S. domination of the OAS. Throughout the Castro regime they seemed to be holding the United States up as a motivational factor. Here we have this enemy toward the north, toward the Americanos, and they are there. We need to mobilize, need to do maximum effort in military and economic activities to be prepared to defend against these people. But with the passage of time this loses emphasis among the man in the street.

Mr. FASCELL. It does not have much steam, as I see it.

Mr. WALLNER. This might be a factor in causing Castro to become a little more subtle in his foreign policy effort.

Mr. FASCELL. Does DIA monitor all their radio broadcasts from Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir. We, however, do have access to translations.

Mr. FASCELL. Do the Cubans have specific broadcasts into the Miami area like they used to have? They had some broadcasts beamed directly at the black community and directly at the Cuban community.

Mr. WALLNER. I think they still do that. They broadcast extensively to the rest of Latin America.

Mr. FASCELL. You are not sure about broadcasts directly into the United States specifically targeted for certain groups?

Mr. WALLNER. I think they still do on a selected basis. Not as frequently as they do to Latin America. They go every day to Latin America but once in a while they will come into Florida.

Mr. FASCELL. How do we characterize the propaganda efforts of the Cubans toward Latin America? Is it major or minor?

Mr. WALLNER. I would call it either major or substantial. It is quite an effort for the size of the country.

Mr. FASCELL. What is your estimate of Castro's reaction to the Soviets' refusal to substantially support the Allende government for the whole time he was in power?

STATEMENT OF LT. NELSON H. LITSINGER, U.S. NAVY, ANALYST, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Lieutenant LITSINGER. When Allende went to Moscow he asked mainly for cash. He had minor commitments to pay off first. The

Soviets were either unable or unwilling to provide this. [Security deletion.]

As you may recall, Allende went to Cuba prior to going to Moscow to seek advice on how to deal with the Soviets. [Security deletion.]

Admiral WHITMIRE. The Soviets did offer Allende credits but he said, in effect, "I don't need credits. I need cash." [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Early on in the Allende government wasn't there a credit deal made with the Russians for US\$50 million?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. Yes, there was a small offer of credit to pay off an immediate loan. That was paid, yes, sir. Allende asked for something on the order of [security deletion] when he went in January 1972.

Mr. FASCELL. Let's go back to what the Soviets actually did do. Did I understand correctly that they gave a \$50 million credit?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. This was a loan, sir. This was a \$50 million cash loan, paid on short-term deficit.

Mr. FASCELL. That is the way it was used?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. And that is still due and owing?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. It seems to me I recall from prior briefings that Allende used only a small portion of another larger credit because it was tied to Russian machinery. It seems to me Allende wanted Czechoslovakian tractors, and they would not let him have them. Was that a separate credit deal?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. Yes. I believe you are referring to a separate credit deal. The Soviets did extend [security deletion] credit, [security deletion] for military purchases. However, this was to take the form of material assistance [security deletion]. There was no cash involved.

Mr. FASCELL. And that was never used up by the Chilean government?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. No, sir. However, they did make some purchases under that agreement.

Mr. FASCELL. Do we know the extent?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. It was very limited. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. So \$50 million cash to pay short-term debt, extension of [security deletion] in credit of which a small amount was actually used and that is where it stopped.

Lieutenant LITSINGER. Yes, sir. Allende could not get the military to use any of this credit. They made several purchase missions. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Now, the extent of the Cuban government's support of the extremists under the Allende government, as I gather, was in arming somewhere around 20,000 men. Is that correct? And were deliveries of small arms and ammunition actually identified?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. Yes, sir, [security deletion].

Mr. FASCELL. But that might just be whisky talk.

Lieutenant LITSINGER. It could be, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. For a purpose. I don't mean the guy was drunk. He was just floating that.

Lieutenant LITSINGER. However, the Chilean military is proceeding with searches and they are recovering submachine guns and Soviet made small arms.

Mr. FASCELL. How long prior to the actual coup in Chile was it that Allende turned over factories to workers and—what was the time frame for this?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. This was immediately after the June 29 rebellion in Santiago. There had been some rumors of extreme leftist supporters of the government occupying factories prior to the rebellion. However, it came out in the open after the rebellion. [Security deletion.] However, the MIR once having called their people out into the streets decided to go further and take over the factories to pursue a course of socialism. Allende did nothing to stop it.

Mr. FASCELL. Did Allende actually issue an order in effect to the workers to take over the factories?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. He issued an order on the 29th to the workers to occupy the factories. He never called this order back. But he did not order that they be occupied on a permanent basis. This was done at the instigation of the more extremist elements.

Mr. FASCELL. As a matter of fact, factories were taken over, were they not?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. The managers, owners—do we have any information as to whether or not they were executed in the takeover by the workers?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. No, we do not.

Mr. FASCELL. We don't know what happened.

Lieutenant LITSINGER. As far as we know, sir, the anti-Allende elements in the factories, whether these were managers or other personnel, were allowed to proceed out of the factories. We have no reports of deaths or violence when the workers took over the factories.

Mr. FASCELL. Do we have any reports of death or violence after the coup when the workers refused to let people into the factories and they had pitched battles between the military and the workers?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. Yes, sir, we do have approximate figures on this. About the best we can estimate right now is [security deletion] in the vicinity of 1,000 were killed immediately following the coup. That is, between September 11 and September 30.

Mr. FASCELL. But that is overall. That is not related to actual reestablishment of management in the factories?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. No, sir, it is not.

Mr. FASCELL. That was an overall estimate on deaths?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. Yes, sir. Due to the confusion down there and the unreliable reporting we really do not know how many workers, per se, were killed in this, or how many noninvolved innocent bystanders were killed.

Mr. FASCELL. I have had talks with several people including the Foreign Minister of the new government and the former Speaker of the House in Chile. I get the distinct impression from talking to those gentlemen that the military is not about to be democratic either now, or in the near future. This is a long-term proposition. I gather from your estimates that you are more cautious about that, but that is my impression. So that means they are not going to restore a free

press; they are not going to restore Congress; they are not going to restore anything. They are not even thinking of elections.

I get the feeling also that they are going to do what Allende refused to do, which is to consolidate their strength and eliminate their enemies. They are doing it methodically and they must have a blacklist somewhere which they are following. But, anyway does Cuba have military equipment to fill in all of those artillery sites?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir, they have sufficient equipment on the islands.

Mr. FASCELL. So it is a political decision that keeps them from placing the artillery pieces there now?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. They are concerned about our reaction. I don't know what our reaction would be. So what, they put artillery pieces around the base?

Mr. WALLNER. If they use the artillery pieces then we have a different problem.

Mr. FASCELL. Now that the airlift has ended in Cuba are there numbers of people still trying to get out of the islands and are they getting away?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir. We still believe there are substantial numbers that want to leave. The last official list we have from the Swiss—the freedom flights which were terminated earlier this year contained some 3,000 names. That is the official list. That is only those people that have said to the Cubans, "We want to leave." Estimates of others that want to leave could go into the hundreds of thousands, really. [Security deletion.] They are still periodically using rafts and other homemade devices to get away from the Castro government.

Mr. FASCELL. What is going on in Cuba? Is Castro still shooting people?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir, we do not have any evidence of executions. It is an austere life and they realize while it is true they are better off than they were under Batista they don't see any chance for improvement. They don't see any chance to get ahead. It is just more of the same. This is causing them to look for ways to get out.

Mr. FASCELL. What happened to their sugar crop?

Mr. WALLNER. The sugar crop is gradually increasing with Soviet advice and material.

Mr. FASCELL. They went to a low of 4 million tons.

Mr. WALLNER. 4.2 million. They are gradually increasing. They will probably get over 5 million this year and possibly as high as 5.5 next year.

Mr. FASCELL. What are they doing with the sugar? Are the Russians eating it all?

Mr. WALLNER. Most of it. They are using some of it in trade arrangements with other countries.

Mr. FASCELL. The Russians don't use that much cane sugar, so what do they do with it? They don't use that much cane sugar.

Mr. WALLNER. I don't know.

Lieutenant LITSINGER. The Russians are in effect blowing up the Cuban economy by keeping a higher price than current market value.

Mr. FASCELL. We did that for years.

Lieutenant LITSINGER. They are then either storing or reselling their sugar.

Mr. FASCELL. They cannot be storing it.

Lieutenant LITSINGER. We have reports that they are storing some of the sugar and then reselling most of it.

Mr. FASCELL. That is pretty good. The Russians are reading our propaganda. That is cute.

Mr. WHALEN. What was their highest production figure?

Mr. WALLNER. 8.5 million in 1970 when they were shooting for an all-time high of 10 million. That effort in 1970 set them back, as I told the subcommittee last year.

Mr. WHALEN. What was the highest figure in the 1950's, do you recall?

Mr. WALLNER. There were approximately 7.4 million short tons under controlled marketing conditions.

Mr. WHALEN. They got as high as 7 million. What are the Cubans doing to feed their people?

Mr. WALLNER. They are importing most of it. They are trying to increase some of their beef production, and their agricultural products.

Mr. FASCELL. The Russians are not shipping them beef or poultry?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir. They are getting some beef and wheat from Argentina under the new arrangements I talked about. Canada provides them some of these basic commodities. They are looking to the Far East—

Mr. FASCELL. How are they paying for all of this?

Mr. WALLNER. Generally speaking they are paying for it under good credit terms. They try and have tried to maintain their good credit rating with non-Soviet partners. The way they trade it is the way they pay for it. In some cases there is a trade with sugar and in some cases cash. Most of the time it is through their sugar arrangements.

Mr. FASCELL. In other words, they are doing a straight barter deal in terms of their foodstuffs? That means they have to be extremely limited in what they can negotiate for.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir, it is a tough position.

Mr. FASCELL. The Cubans have not improved their international holdings in any way. They have no reserves.

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. So on that score they are just like the Allende government was. They are living on a day-to-day basis for foodstuffs.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir, except they have the Soviets. Allende did not have the Soviets.

Mr. FASCELL. The Soviets are not supplying them with a lot of food and they are not giving anything that would allow them to go into the international market and earn reserves.

Mr. WALLNER. They use their sugar, their nickel. They are improving their nickel production plants in Cuba.

Mr. FASCELL. So if one wanted to be objective about the relationship—and that is the way I have to look at Cuba—the Cuban people today are slaves of the Soviets. They have them working in the fields just to eat.

Mr. WALLNER. In the final analysis that is accurate.

Mr. FASCELL. They are not improving their lot. They may be changing their political structure but as far as making any progress, they are captives. Right?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. That is the way it looks to me, too. That is sad.

Mr. WALLNER. As we said, that is why we still have people trying to get out. They are willing to risk their lives to get out.

Mr. FASCELL. It seems that sooner or later they will realize what is happening. They are chained to the cane fields.

Mr. WALLNER. We should be careful here to put this into perspective. It has not been all bad.

Mr. FASCELL. I understand that.

Mr. WALLNER. In the medical field, in the educational field for the Cubans it is better now than they ever had it under Batista.

Mr. FASCELL. And they got rid of the old psychology of the very conservative Cubans. I can see that. That has to be a plus and I suppose they are selling it on the basis that if you want this kind of freedom then you have to pay the price. I appreciate you pointing out the necessity for perspective. I agree that is essential. The reason I am exploring this is obvious: To see what is the best way to change relationships between the United States and Cuba; what ought to come about and on what basis and how. I am personally not too wild about helping Castro, but doing something for the Cuban people and improving our relationships across the board is something else.

How many political prisoners are there in Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. We really don't know, sir. We have had estimates that run into several thousands but it is something that is very hard to pin down. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Do we detect any change in the Castro government's attitude toward political prisoners?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir, we have not detected any change. They are still keeping the ones they have had.

Mr. FASCELL. They have been in there for years, as I understand it.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. And the reports indicate they are in very bad shape in terms of treatment, food, and so forth.

Mr. WALLNER. The facilities that they are kept in are—

Mr. FASCELL. Inhuman. Worse than the tiger pens of Vietnam.

Mr. WALLNER. Very bad. They have a big one on the Isle of Pines down here and they have several others in the Havana area. Those are the primary prisons.

Mr. FASCELL. As I recall, Castro has refused to let any human rights groups, such as the Red Cross, U.N., OAS, or anybody get in to any of these prison camps. Am I correct?

Mr. WALLNER. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. We are still represented by the Swiss Embassy, right?

Mr. WALLNER. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. And to the best of my recollection, regarding direct representations made by the Swiss involving specific particular individuals, there has been permission granted for representatives of the Swiss Embassy to see certain prisoners. Am I correct?

Mr. WALLNER. I believe so, yes, sir. I am not so sure on the political prisoner aspect but I know that the Swiss have interceded for Americans, U.S. citizens that were cruising in the area on a yacht and ran into trouble and were picked up by the Cubans.

Mr. FASCELL. I was thinking about political prisoners.

Mr. WALLNER. I think they have, yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. I wondered how far the Castro government is going in dealing with the political prisoner problem—like getting packages to them, CARE packages, mail. There is no mail coming from prisoners except that which is sneaked out so the situation there today, despite all of the aura of détente is just as bad as it ever was.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir, from the political prisoner standpoint.

Mr. FASCELL. How would you compare the political prisoner situation in Cuba today with the way it is in Chile today?

Mr. WALLNER. That is a good question, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. I don't want to hold you to it. It is an estimate, an opinion.

Mr. WALLNER. Let me give you my opinion. It is worse in Chile than in Cuba because of sheer numbers and the passage of time. Perhaps knowing how these people are handled in Cuba, and the activities of the junta since the coup in Chile. I think it is probably worse in Chile.

Mr. FASCELL. How would you compare the Cuban situation generally when Castro took over with the present situation in Chile? As I recall Castro executed between 10,000 and 20,000 people with no trials of any kind. He just lined them up and shot them.

Mr. WALLNER. I have seen figures like that. That part of it I think is more extreme from the Cuban side. It is more harsh from the Cuban side.

Lieutenant LITSINGER. Of course the Chilean junta itself claims there are no irregularities and that they are getting the best possible treatment. The only nonpartisan estimates we have are from three Commissions who have been there so far, that is, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Relief Commission of the International Red Cross, and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission.

All three Commissions have noted that the junta is very cooperative in giving them permission to visit all the detention areas including the very important political prisoners on Dawson Island in the south of Chile. They have also noted that the junta has provided what facilities they could. That is, the national stadium was not designed to hold prisoners, however, they have made it as livable as possible. They have pointed out there has been some bad treatment due to the limited facilities. However, none of the Commissions can give exact details on any mistreatment, on any torture or any mass executions without prior trial.

Dr. Reque, of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, did note that there seems to be dichotomy of views. The higher class people have noted no mistreatment, no executions, no midnight knocks on the door, none of this aspect. The lower class people, in the barrios, the slums around Santiago and the big cities always have a story to tell. They always can tell you of somebody who was taken.

Dr. Reque has recommended that the Commission investigate further. He is recommending to the full commission of the American Human Rights Committee that they send a commission to Chile to go into this further. But he has no hard evidence.

Mr. FASCELL. Frankly, as an outside observer and without choosing up sides. I am impressed by the fact that the junta would at least let these people in. You can argue as to whether or not you saw something or did not see it. But in Cuba for 10 years nobody has been able to get in.

Mr. WALLNER. They did not let one into Cuba.

Lieutenant LITSINGER. It must be emphasized there are executions taking place in Chile. I believe in the area of [security deletion] have been executed so far. However, they are being given a trial and the only summary executions that we know of are those who offer armed resistance to security forces.

Mr. FASCELL. What is the intelligence community's opinion with respect to the Americans who are down there, who disappeared, or who are dead?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. We know only of two. The first one I believe, his name was Mr. Teruggi, was under custody in the national stadium at Santiago. The security forces there claim he was released. The only thing we can go on is the coroner's report. Under Chilean law all deaths must have an autopsy. So there was an autopsy performed. The autopsy report said he was killed with a 7.62-millimeter weapon.

Mr. FASCELL. That is a NATO weapon.

Lieutenant LITSINGER. Yes, sir; NATO does use that caliber weapon. However, it is also the standard Warsaw Pact caliber. Chilean security forces use a 9-millimeter weapon. It is also the weapon for Soviet forces so we can make no judgment on who killed him. There is a possibility that some national policeman did shoot him. We do not know this.

Mr. FASCELL. How about the other man?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. Mr. Horman we know nothing about. I understand his body was found and he was under detention for a period of about 3 days. However, the Chileans also claim he was released prior to his death.

Mr. FASCELL. What were these people doing?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. I do not know, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. What part of the intelligence community is responsible for reaching some kind of an opinion with respect to the operations and the conduct of Americans in foreign countries? Is that strictly CIA?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.] This is really outside of our purview.

Mr. FASCELL. In the profession I wondered where the ball is.

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Admiral WHITMIRE. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. I would like to pursue that somewhere some time. It always worried me a little bit [security deletion.] I wonder where you get the information on what they found out. I have been asking everybody about these men and nobody knows anything about them. They don't know if they were teaching school or visiting friends or what they were doing. Yet they are both dead.

Mr. WALLNER. I recall a press clipping that one of the two persons killed was a student visiting down there or something. Prior to the coup according to State Department figures, I believe there had been about 200 American tourists in the country. Most of them are trying to leave and the other gentleman may have been in that class.

Mr. FASCELL. Is Castro executing any people these days?

Mr. WALLNER. No; we have no reports of that.

Mr. FASCELL. Has his attitude changed with respect to the church?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir; it has not. The church is still persecuted and held down very strongly.

Mr. FASCELL. To what extent is religion practiced in Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. The reports I have seen indicate it is a very small extent and then only in very small personal groups and sort of clandestine sermons.

Mr. FASCELL. Is the block system still in effect in Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes; CDR's Committee for defense of the revolution are still much in effect. Their membership is now over 2 million and they are as effective as they ever were.

Mr. FASCELL. What is Castro doing with the people who are turned in by neighbors for one reason or another?

Mr. WALLNER. Most of the time they are tried and sentenced, the length of which depends on the violation. As I read the reporting on this subject, if it is serious, [security deletion]. In either case, they are given a perfunctory trial and then sentenced.

Mr. FASCELL. So actually the government is brooking no opposition by anybody.

Mr. WALLNER. No organized opposition.

Mr. FASCELL. And anybody who is opposed to Castro is a political prisoner immediately?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. There is no freedom of labor, is there?

Mr. WALLNER. When the sugar harvest rolls around, and it is going to start again next month, everybody that can be spared from essential industry is diverted to that effort. This includes the military.

Mr. FASCELL. Is the place of work, one's position and the nature of one's work—is that all directed by the government?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir. Most of it is. They still allow a small number of small businessmen in the city to provide what limited consumer products are available.

Mr. FASCELL. Is all consumer product distribution under government control in Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. I assume that all press and all radio is all government controlled in Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. There is no opposition press, no opposition radio?

Mr. WALLNER. No free press to speak of; no, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Do we have any evidence of any underground activity and, if so, on what scale?

Mr. WALLNER. No, evidence of any kind that is organized even in the small cell atmosphere. We do from time to time get reports of open manifestation against the Castro government. As an example, we had some report of anti-Castro graffiti on the walls of buildings in Santiago. I believe that was last year. This sort of thing does surface from time to time. Another report was that Castro had met with a group of students in one of the other cities, I believe, and they had had an open and frank discussion about the direction of Cuba, and the students let it be known that they were not generally happy with what had happened.

Mr. FASCELL. And they have not been heard of since?

Mr. WALLNER. We have not had any more reports.

Mr. FASCELL. How about sabotage? Is there any substantial sabotage going on in Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. It does not appear to be substantial. Again, from time to time we get reports of somebody throwing something into the sugar machinery in a mill and damaging it that way or sabotaging some of the railroad stock.

Mr. FASCELL. What is your estimate on the support of Castro by the Cuban people?

Mr. WALLNER. I think he is still their boy.

We are beginning to see the start of what might be growing resentment against him but it is just barely getting off the ground with these cases I mentioned. It might be several years before it gets to be—

Mr. FASCELL. Do you have any reason to believe that if there were an "uprising"—I will put that in quotes because I don't want to define it—there would be any substantial elements of the military that would defect?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir, I don't believe there would be.

Mr. FASCELL. I don't either. Because I think they all love Castro ever since he has been in power, and even before. I had a fight with the intelligence community about that.

Mr. WALLNER. I might bring up one point that is interesting. We have some good indications now that the Cuban Army is in the process of reversing its active duty strength with its reserve strength. [Security deletion.] We have a solid indication, put out in a speech by Raul Castro, that they are planning to reverse this, put more people in reserve and fewer people on active duty for two primary reasons: To reduce their costs and free more people for full-time support in the economic fields.

As this evolves and comes into play we might see groups within the military that don't like this. Particularly those in the reserve element.

Mr. FASCELL. What is the status of the armed forces in Cuba, or their condition? Is it excellent? [Security deletion.]

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.] They are well-equipped. They are well-trained and they seem to have an elite position in Cuban society.

Mr. FASCELL. What is the latest estimate on the size and capability of an external military force in Cuba? In other words, what kind of external force, military force, would it take to compete with what Cuba has militarily? What is the estimate?

Mr. WALLNER. I am not really sure, sir. [Security deletion.] I cannot be more specific than that. I'm sorry.

Admiral WHITMIRE. As you know, this is not our area of expertise.

Mr. FASCELL. I am not holding you to it. We were just talking and that is just a guess on your part. You might be interested to know there are estimates that it would be equal to a D-day landing on Normandy.

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. You told us about the Army. What is the status of the Air Force? What do they have and how up to date is it?

Mr. WALLNER. They have about [security deletion] fighter aircraft, Soviet aircraft, including MIG-21J model.

Mr. FASCELL. Did the famous MIG-23 ever show up any place?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir. It never showed up.

Mr. FASCELL. It was just a number on the drawing board?

Mr. WALLNER. Nor has the SU-7. We continue to watch all those reports closely and attempt to verify them. It is well-equipped with

about [security deletion] fighters including MIG-21's. It is, as are the other services, essentially defensive oriented.

Mr. FASCELL. Do they rely on the three main airfields?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir. The three main airfields are still there; San Antonio de los Baños, Santa Clara, and Holguin.

Mr. FASCELL. Are those airfields strictly military?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. What is their condition? How do we rate them?

Mr. WALLNER. They are good.

Mr. FASCELL. First-class?

Mr. WALLNER. They are good in terms of surface, runway length, in terms of facilities there to maintain the aircraft they have.

Mr. FASCELL. The TU-95 Russian D: Is that primarily a cargo or intelligence aircraft?

Mr. WALLNER. It is a long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft.

Mr. FASCELL. They can land at any of these airfields?

Mr. WALLNER. It can. However, it has only landed at Jose Marti.

Mr. FASCELL. So they landed it at a regular commercial international airport. They have not landed a TU-95 at any of the three military fields.

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you attach any significance to that at all?

Mr. WALLNER. No. [Security deletion.]

Lieutenant LITSINGER. Mr. Chairman, there might be one other highlight there. The TU-95 also has a civilian version the TU-114, which have similar engines, similar airframes, and they use it on airflights right into Havana. As an explanation for them going to Jose Marti, they may have a sufficient number of parts and technicians at that airfield.

Mr. FASCELL. That is certainly very sensible. My limited experience with the Russians is they do not throw their money around. They are as conservative as they come. [Security deletion.]

What about the Navy? You told us they had new patrol boats. What else have the Russians given them? I assume the Russians are supplying all of this.

Lieutenant LITSINGER. Right. With the exception of some jet trainers in the Air Force it is all U.S.S.R. equipment. The Cubans also have the Komar class guided-missile patrol boat which has half the launchers that the OSA has—two launchers as opposed to four. They have about [security deletion] of those. Total of [security deletion] combat tanks including some torpedo boats. Some larger subchasers, some smaller subchasers and even a few U.S. type patrol escorts.

Mr. FASCELL. What is their naval capability? Could they interdict a sealift of substantial size?

Mr. WALLNER. Not for very long. They could initiate some activity with the OSA and the Komar. They are primarily antishipping weapon systems. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Are the Russians still supplying the Cubans with these Omicron fishing boats that are loaded with electronic gear?

Lieutenant LITSINGER. The Russians no longer supply any fishing boats to the Cubans. The Omicron that you mentioned—the Lamda and the Sigma boats are built in Cuba, mainly wooden construction,

and are handled readily by the Cuban yards. Since 1962 and 1963 the Soviets did provide about 12 SRTM class trawlers to the Cubans. They have provided no more since then. [Security deletion.] The Cubans themselves do equip their fishing boats with what we consider an excessive amount of radio gear both to keep in contact with Cuba and possibly for intelligence collection.

Mr. FASCELL. What is your estimate on the Cuban intelligence capability electronically, not penetration.

Mr. WALLNER. I wonder if we could go off the record.

Mr. FASCELL. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. FASCELL. Back on the record.

I want to ask about the anti-aircraft missiles in Cuba, as to whether or not the new SAM's are in there.

Mr. WALLNER. We have no indication of new SAM's. The SAM the Cubans have is SA-2 which is an older version.

Mr. FASCELL. What is its limit?

Mr. WALLNER. In horizontal range it is about [security deletion] nautical miles; altitude about [security deletion] feet.

Mr. FASCELL. How does that compare with SAM-6?

Mr. WALLNER. It is much older and it is not nearly as good.

Commander ELDRIDGE. The SAM-6 has [security deletion] to [security deletion] miles range up to [security deletion] feet.

Admiral WHITMIRE. SA-6 is transportable and it can fire low and is effective up to about [security deletion] feet.

Mr. FASCELL. What is our attitude if we suddenly wake up and find a whole bunch of SA-6's in Cuba. Would we be upset or would we say this is modernization? I know you have to report it but how would you personally feel about it?

Admiral WHITMIRE. It would be an increasing capability. I would report they have increased their capability.

Mr. FASCELL. You would take that as a serious matter. I assume.

Admiral WHITMIRE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. I would too.

Is the radar on the SA-6 portable?

Admiral WHITMIRE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Do we have any estimate on how long it takes to set up one of these things?

Admiral WHITMIRE. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. On naval capability in Cuba, their briefing indicates there is no additional construction or activity in Cienfuegos. Is there any anywhere else in the island?

Mr. WALLNER. None that we could detect.


Mr. FASCELL. Gentlemen, Admiral, let me thank you very much for taking all of this time and being so patient and answering questions. We appreciate it. It was one of the most thorough briefings we have had an opportunity to get into. I think it has been extremely useful.

Mike wants me to ask whether or not there are any SAM sites at Guantanamo.

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 the subcommittee was adjourned.]



SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

Part 5

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1974

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2 p.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Abraham Kazen, Jr., presiding.

Mr. KAZEN. The subcommittee will come to order.

Before we begin, I would like to explain to you the absence of the members of this subcommittee. Today has been a pretty hard legislative day on the floor. As you know, we have had four vetoes that are going to be acted on today. We are in the process now of voting on the second one of the four measures. And for that reason, we may have an abbreviated meeting here this afternoon. We will proceed to hear our witnesses. We are very sorry. On behalf of Congressman Fascell, he asked me to advise you—we didn't have the time to cancel today, so we are making this effort. Any statement that you make will be put in the record and we will proceed as far as we possibly can.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, might I make one further point, that the third veto is a bill sponsored by Mr. Fascell.

Mr. KAZEN. He has to handle the next one. That is the reason he is not here.

Since Fidel Castro deliberately moved Cuba into the Soviet bloc the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee has maintained a very active interest in Cuba, its efforts to overthrow hemisphere governments and its use by the Soviet Union both as a military base to threaten this country and as a political and economic spring board for all of Latin America and the Caribbean.

While there is some evidence to indicate that Cuban export of revolution has lessened, it is clear from the last week's vote to maintain OAS sanctions against Cuba that many countries of the hemisphere, among them the two largest, continue to be concerned by Cuban subversive efforts, the thousands of Cuban political prisoners, and the use of Cuba by the Soviets. Obviously, they are concerned about Castro and his regime.

Of fundamental importance to this country is the potential use of Cuba by the Soviet Union as a major strategic military base. Twice in the past, during the 1962 missile crisis and more recently during the so-called minicrisis of 1970, Cuba has been a serious source of conflict. Since we have no assurance that such will not be the case again in the future, it continues to be imperative that both the Executive and Congress maintain a close watch on Cuba. To aid us in carrying out this

objective we are pleased to have with us to discuss the political implications of Soviet submarine visits to Cuba two representatives from the Brookings Institution who have recently completed a major study on this subject. Tomorrow we will hear from representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency in executive session.

Today's witnesses are Dr. Barry M. Blechman, senior fellow and a member of the defense analysis program at the Brookings Institution, and Ms. Stephanie E. Levinson, an international economist with Brookings foreign policy staff.

Both witnesses have brief biographical sketches appended to their statement which we will include in the printed record immediately prior to the testimony.

Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. BARRY M. BLECHMAN, SENIOR FELLOW AND MEMBER OF THE DEFENSE ANALYSIS PROGRAM, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Barry M. Blechman is a senior fellow and a member of the Defense Analysis Program at the Brookings Institution.

Before joining the Brookings staff in 1971, Dr. Blechman was affiliated with the Center for Naval Analyses for nearly six years. During that time, he participated in studies of U.S. anti-submarine warfare forces and strategic policies, and directed a study of U.S. military options in the Indian Ocean.

He is one of the co-authors, this year, of Brookings' annual review of the federal budget: *Setting National Priorities*; he contributed to the 1973 and 1972 editions as well. His other writings published by Brookings' include: *Strategic Forces: Issues for the Mid-Seventies* and *The Changing Soviet Navy*. He is also the author of several articles on issues in U.S. defense policy, published in various newspapers and journals.

Dr. Blechman received his Ph. D. in Political Science from Georgetown University in 1971. His dissertation was entitled, "The Consequences of Israel's Repressals: An Assessment".

Blechman is 31 years old, married, and the father of two daughters. He presently resides in Reston, Virginia.

Mr. BLECHMAN. Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, we are pleased that you have called upon us to discuss the recent visits by Soviet submarines to Cuban ports. We trust the subcommittee understands that any opinions expressed here are ours alone, and should not be attributed to the Brookings Institution, its trustees, or to other staff members.

RECENT SUBMARINE VISITS

The employment of the Soviet Navy in political roles—its use short of actual conflict to support the achievement of foreign policy objectives—has become an increasingly important element in Soviet naval operations during the past 10 years. The evolving role of the Soviet Navy as an instrument of foreign policy has been most apparent in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. Of lesser prominence, but perhaps of no less importance, have been Soviet naval operations in the Caribbean. Indeed, the series of visits by Soviet submarines to Cuban ports since 1969 provides an almost textbook case of Soviet political-military tactics and poses important questions about Soviet motives.

In 1970, the Soviet Union attempted to establish a submarine base at the Cuban port of Cienfuegos. This subcommittee, of course, is fully aware of the details of this incident. The result was an "understanding" between the United States and the Soviet Union as to what the U.S.S.R. would and would not do with regard to the basing of naval vessels in Cuba. Nonetheless, all the facilities constructed in 1970 remain at Cienfuegos. Moreover, Soviet submarines have continued to visit Cuba. Since the 1970 confrontation 15 visits have been reported in publicly available sources. Most significantly, two of these visits were by submarines armed with strategic missiles.

On April 29, 1972, a Golf class diesel-powered strategic submarine, accompanied by a tender, put in at Bahia de Nipe. The Golf class carries three ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. This submarine is classified as a strategic weapon system in that its missiles are generally believed to be designed for use against fixed land targets. This was the first publicly recorded visit by this type of submarine to a foreign port. The visit was not announced beforehand, and behavior of the accompanying vessels indicated that Soviet officials had some concern for the implications of the visit.

Two years later, that is this year, again on April 29, another Golf class submarine visited Cuba. This time, the visit was announced in advance and the submarine put into Havana. In fact, an article about the visit along with a photograph of the task force and a closeup of the submarine was published in *La Gramma*, Havana's English-language newspaper.

In brief, it seems evident that the U.S.S.R. has been probing the margins of the 1970 "understanding," thereby testing the limits of U.S. tolerance for its military activity in the Caribbean. Following attainment of the "understanding," the Soviet Union has sequentially:

1. Put a November class nuclear-powered attack submarine in Cienfuegos;
2. Put an Echo class nuclear-powered submarine carrying missiles, although not strategic missiles, into Cienfuegos;
3. Put a Golf class diesel-powered strategic ballistic missile submarine into a different Cuban port quietly;
4. Put a Golf class diesel-powered strategic ballistic missile submarine into a different Cuban port in a very public fashion.

And this is just what may be derived from open sources: unclassified reporting on submarine activity is far from complete. For example, with regard to the 1974 Golf class visit: The submarine was reported to have left Havana on May 7; it was reported to have departed the Caribbean on May 30; its activities during the intervening period remain uncertain.

The United States has not protested any of these actions. In fact, in the face of Golf class visits, the United States seems to have narrowed its interpretation of the 1970 "understanding."

Initially, U.S. concern over the use of facilities at Cienfuegos by Soviet submarines clearly was directed at preventing the U.S.S.R. from basing strategic missile submarines in this hemisphere. In this sense, the "understanding" was viewed as an extension of the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement regarding Soviet deployment of land-

based ballistic missiles in Cuba. At the height of the 1970 crisis, an anonymous White House spokesman warned:

The Soviet Union can be under no doubt that we would view the establishment of a strategic base in the Caribbean with the utmost seriousness.

The "understanding" is now interpreted more narrowly—to apply only to nuclear-powered submarines. The administration's current position is best summarized in a statement made by President Nixon in January 1971:

In the event that nuclear subs were serviced either in Cuba, or from Cuba, that would be a violation of the understanding. That has not happened yet.

Thus the Golf class, even though considered a strategic weapon system, is said not to pose a challenge to the "understanding" because it has a diesel propulsion system. Unfortunately, this fine distinction—even if valid—has not stood the test of time.

One month after President Nixon's statement, a nuclear-powered November class submarine with a tender visited Cienfuegos. Whether the submarine actually was serviced in the port remains uncertain. It was reported, however, that Soviet sailors were observed on the soccer field and thus at least one part of the facility was in use.

The ramifications of these submarine visits should not be overstated. After all, they have occurred over a protracted period of time. And the U.S.S.R. has not, as yet, challenged the narrow interpretation of the "understanding"; for example, by sending a Yankee class nuclear-powered strategic submarine into Cienfuegos. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the Soviet Union is in the process of establishing precedents and testing U.S. resolve over this issue.

We have appended a list of submarine visits to this statement, at least those visits recorded in public sources.

My colleague will discuss some of the political implications of the visits for U.S. foreign policy.

STATEMENT OF MS. STEPHANIE E. LEVINSON, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIST WITH BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Stephanie E. Levinson is an international economist who joined the Brookings foreign policy staff in 1972.

She has assisted with the 1975 edition of Brookings annual review of the federal budget: *Setting National Priorities* and the forthcoming publication, *Facilitating Economic Change: Adjustment Assistance and United States Trade Policies*.

Ms. Levinson received a Masters degree in international economics from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in 1970 and a Bachelors degree in economics from the Sarah Lawrence College in 1968.

Ms. Levinson is 27 years old, and presently resides in the District of Columbia.

Ms. LEVINSON. No doubt the reasons why the U.S.S.R. has continued to send submarines to Cuban ports are complicated and of multiple origins. The fact that this activity has been pursued even after the tempest raised in 1970, however, indicates that Soviet purposes are likely to be more important than those associated with everyday naval operations. The military advantages provided by a base in Cuba are not commensurate with the political risks of continued submarine visits.

It is possible that the submarine visits have been initiatives of the Soviet Navy and not fully endorsed by the U.S.S.R.'s political leadership. There is some evidence that the Soviet Navy was unhappy about the U.S.S.R.'s abandonment of the Cienfuegos facility so quickly on the heels of the White House warning in 1970. Unfortunately, we know too little about Soviet decisionmaking process to conjecture about the likelihood of such bureaucratic independence.

Alternative explanations suggest that the submarine visits were used to strengthen the Soviet position in the strategic arms limitation talks or to help solidify Soviet relations with Cuba.

A final explanation is the most worrisome from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy. In this view, the submarine visits are being used as a device to test the strength and endurance of U.S. will and commitments. Probing around the margins of the 1970 "understanding" provide one means of examining the degree to which the United States is willing to take risks in its broad set of relations with the U.S.S.R. in order to prevent the latter from achieving a shift in the two sides' relative military capabilities. If this indeed has been the Soviet motive, then the U.S. response to the visits—essentially an endorsement of their behavior—can only encourage future actions by the Soviet Union of a similar nature.

The Soviet retreat from Cienfuegos can be understood as a tactical withdrawal. Taking one step back in 1970 does not imply by any means that the Soviet Government abandoned its objective of establishing a base in Cuba. Rather, the U.S. protest indicated only that more subtle, less direct, and more gradual tactics were required. Instead of establishing the base in one fell swoop, precedents for submarine operations out of Cuba needed to be established. Thus, over a protracted period of time, submarines made increasingly provocative visits to Cuban ports. Because each step was very small, and individually of little significance, it was difficult for the United States to justify a meaningful protest. Yet, taken as a whole, the series of visits represented an important alteration of the earlier "understanding." And future steps eventually could achieve what was desired in 1970—the establishment of an operating submarine base in Cuba.

Thus the series of Soviet submarine visits to Cuba since 1970 poses a difficult and deliberate problem for U.S. foreign policy. It is not strictly a military problem: Even over the longer term the establishment of a submarine base in Cuba would pose qualitatively new military threats to the United States. The Soviet submarine visits to Cuba, by gradually encroaching upon previous "understandings," more importantly pose a political challenge to U.S. security. Potentially, and if successful over the long term, this sort of activity could help to bring into question, in the eyes of Soviet decisionmakers and leaders in third nations, the credibility and impact of U.S. statements, warnings, and other forms of verbal behavior. And without such credibility, the fabric of the U.S. posture in world affairs could be undermined seriously.

Two specific recommendations follow from this assessment:

1. The process of normalizing U.S. relations with Cuba has been set in motion. Several statements, tentatively and cautiously expressing at least the possibility of normalization have been made by both

sides; other events, such as the recent visit to Cuba by Senators Javits and Pell, lend substance to this view. As the process continues, the United States should expect various commitments and restraints from the Cuban Government in exchange for the relaxation of our own policies. One of these commitments should involve a pledge not to permit Cuba to be used for military operations by extrahemispheric powers. The pledge should be public and explicit, and its enforcement must be taken seriously by all concerned parties.

2. Any further steps leading to the support of submarine deployments from Cuba should be assumed to constitute a violation of previous understandings. While apparently it is too late to prevent the servicing of some submarines in Cuba, any measure to expand the type of weapon system supported in this fashion, or the scope of support granted to these now "approved" systems, should be resisted strenuously. To accomplish this, the United States must be prepared to make a major issue of what will appear to be very minor departure—a port visit by a nuclear-powered, but older and not very capable Hotel class strategic submarine, for example—and to receive considerable criticism from domestic and foreign sources because of this resistance. The United States also must be prepared to slow progress in other areas—arms control negotiations or technology exchanges, for example—as means of gaining leverage to force a Soviet backdown.

In our view, it is only by demonstrating a willingness to make major issues of single events which, in isolation, sometimes appear relatively insignificant, that the United States can bring the Soviet Union to understand that the process of normalizing our mutual relations requires concessions on the part of both sides.

That concludes our statements. We would be happy to entertain any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Barry M. Blechman and Ms. Stephanie E. Levinson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BARRY M. BLECHMAN AND STEPHANIE E. LEVINSON,
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the basing of naval vessels in Cuba. Nonetheless, all the facilities constructed in 1970 remain at Cienfuegos. Moreover, Soviet submarines have continued to visit Cuba, since the 1970 confrontation 15 visits have been reported in publicly available sources. Most significantly, two of these visits were by submarines armed with strategic missiles.

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POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

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Two.—Any further steps leading to the support of submarine deployments from Cuba should be assumed to constitute a violation of previous understandings. While apparently it is too late to prevent the servicing of some submarines

in Cuba, any measure to expand the type of weapon system supported in this fashion, or the scope of support granted to these now "Approved" systems, should be resisted strenuously. To accomplish this, the United States must be prepared to make a major issue of what will appear to be very minor departure—a port visit by a nuclear-powered, but older and not very capable Hotel-class strategic submarine, for example—and to receive considerable criticism from domestic and foreign sources because of this resistance. The United States also must be prepared to slow progress in other areas—arms control negotiations or technology exchanges, for example—as means of gaining leverage to force a Soviet back-down.

In our view, it is only demonstrating a willingness to make major issues of single events which, in isolation, sometimes appear relatively insignificant, that the United States can bring the Soviet Union to understand that the process of normalizing our mutual relations requires concessions on the part of both sides.

APPENDIX

VISITS BY SOVIET SUBMARINES TO CUBAN PORTS, JULY 1, 1969 TO JULY 1, 1974¹

Dates	Number and class of submarines	Location	Tender present?	Comments
July 20-27, 1969	2 Foxtrot, 1 November	Havana	Yes	November did not enter port.
May 14-29, 1970	2 Foxtrot, 1 Echo II	Cienfuegos	Yes	
Dec. 7-13, 1970	1 Foxtrot	Antilla	Yes	
Dec. 15-18, 1970	do	Havana	Yes	
Dec. 22-27, 1970	do	Cienfuegos	Yes	
Feb. 14-28, 1971	1 November	do	Yes	
May 27 to June 4, 1971	1 Echo II	Antilla	Yes	
Oct. 31 to Nov. 9, 1971	2 Foxtrot	Havana and Cienfuegos	No	
Mid-January to May 15, 1972	1 Foxtrot	Maríel	No	Submarine operated intermittently out of this port.
Mid-Apr. to 26, 1972	do	Havana	No	
Apr. 29 to May 6, 1972	1 Golf II	Bahía de Nipe	Yes	
Dec. 2, 1972 to Jan. 4, 1973	1 Echo II	Cienfuegos	No	
Dec. 5, 1972 to Feb. 12, 1973	1 Foxtrot	do	Yes	
Aug. 4-8, 1973	1 Echo II	Havana	No	
Aug. 20-29, 1973	1 Echo II, 1 Foxtrot	Cienfuegos	No	Echo was damaged while in port.
Sept. 7-7, 1973	1 Foxtrot	Maríel	No	
Oct. 1-15, 1973	do	Havana	No	
Apr. 29 to May 7, 1974	1 Golf II	do	No	

¹ This table does not contain a complete listing of Soviet submarine visits to Cuba; only those which have been reported in press releases by the Department of Defense and in testimony before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. KAZEN. Thank you both for your statements.

Doctor, what do you believe were the central points of the 1970 understanding with respect to Cuba?

Mr. BLECHMAN. I believe the major point was that the Soviets shouldn't base or service or provide support in any way for strategic weapons, sea-based strategic weapon systems.

Mr. KAZEN. What form did the understanding take; was it written, was it verbal, how was it concluded?

Mr. BLECHMAN. It is very difficult to say. There really has been extraordinary secrecy about the process, particularly for this Nation. And after how many, 4 years, have passed now. My assumption is that there were a series of meetings, the most significant being on October 13 between Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Dobrynin and Mr. Gromyko. As a result of these meetings, various memoranda for the record, things of that nature were written to express the sense of the participants as to what was agreed. I doubt if there is any formal document that both sides signed.

Mr. KAZEN. Why would the Soviets have wanted a base at Cienfuegos in 1970?

Mr. BLECHMAN. Having a base in Cuba provides a number of efficiencies for the Soviet Navy. For example, some Soviet strategic submarines operate off Bermuda. There have been reports to that effect in the press. The transit distance from Cuba to this operating area is shorter than from the Soviets' normal bases up in the Kola peninsula. Therefore, with the same number of submarines they can stay in the patrol area longer, rather than transiting back and forth. Additionally, it would permit them to reduce the frequency with which the submarines have to pass through that narrow sector between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom which is the area in which the submarines are most vulnerable to detection by NATO antisubmarine systems.

Mr. KAZEN. Doctor, let me ask you this question. Why did you undertake this study and under whose sponsorship was it taken?

Mr. BLECHMAN. This study has been done on our own. There is a series of conferences at Dalhousie University each year on the Soviet Navy. The Soviet Navy has been an interest of mine for some time now. My interest in their Cuban operations was prompted by this article in *La Gramma* which I found quite extraordinary. I looked into it and wrote up a paper for the Dalhousie conference initially.

Mr. KAZEN. If President Nixon's statement of January 1971, regarding servicing of nuclear submarines was a change of the 1970 understanding, to what do you attribute the change?

Mr. BLECHMAN. I don't know that his statement was a change. I think that it was probably a casual statement. It wasn't meant to express the full sense of the agreement. The statement was made in the course of an interview with TV network executives. It covered a whole range of topics. It wasn't the sort of thing where there was a purposeful plant, a directed official statement. I think the Defense Department is now pointing to the statement as justification for backing off from protesting about the recent visits.

You know, actually, in terms of military efficiencies, it is more important to have the base for the diesel-powered submarines which have more difficulty in terms of endurance, the amount of time they can stay out in a patrol area.

Mr. KAZEN. Then it is probable that Nixon misspoke on that occasion and really meant strategic submarines?

Mr. BLECHMAN. I believe the understanding probably referred to strategic systems generally; the use of nuclear is very ambiguous. It is used to indicate a type of weapon, as well as a type of submarine. I don't believe that it was an accurate statement of our concerns, at least in 1970.

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Whalen, do you have any questions?

Mr. WHALEN. Yes, I have several, Mr. Chairman.

On page 7, Ms. Levinson, you made this following statement:

The military advantages provided by a base in Cuba are not commensurate with the political risks of continued submarine visits.

I wasn't sure about the later comments, I am not sure it was clear as to why the risk exceed any military advantage. I wondered if you might elaborate on that a little bit?

Ms. LEVINSON. Dr. Blechman just spoke about what the advantages of having a military base in Cuba would be and that it would be more advantageous for diesel-powered submarines to be there. However, to have strategic-based submarines in a Cuban base is basically a political ploy. They really don't need the Cuban port, but politically it could disturb the United States. The fact that we had the minicrisis in 1970, makes it doubtful they would risk basing just for that small military advantage. The adverse political reaction which might be encountered does not appear to be worth the military gains which would be achieved.

Mr. WHALEN. This would seem to confirm your later implication that it is the military that has made the decision to do this rather than the political leaders?

Ms. LEVINSON. That is right. There is some indication that the Soviet Navy as we said was not that happy about the quick withdrawal in 1970 and Admiral Gorshkov, the Soviet commander in chief, is said to be aligned with conservative elements in the Party.

However, we are really not able to say that there is a true rift between the military and the political leadership. Decisions on naval operations—the daily decisions on strictly military aspects of it—would be more likely to be made by the Navy than the Politburo, but ultimately they would get the policy guidance from the political side.

Mr. WHALEN. On page 10 you refer to the process of normalization between Cuba and the United States which has been set in motion. Of course, I think this process was slowed down somewhat last week as a result of the OAS meeting.

Be that as it may, you in point 1 suggest steps that Cuba should take to continue this progress. One of the steps you suggested is that they publicly announce that there will be no more visits by Soviet submarines.

My question is, really, what has Cuba to gain by normalization of relations with the United States? I think we have too often looked at it from our perspective, rather than theirs.

Ms. LEVINSON. In terms of normalization, I think that both the Soviets and the Cubans stand to gain economically much more than the United States. First in comparative terms, the Cuban economy will profit much more than we if the embargo is lifted. Second, the Soviets are in the unenviable position of being held responsible for the successes and failures of the Cuban economy. Therefore, in both instances, it would stand to reason that in negotiating the normalization of any relations with the Cubans we should be aware of our relative position of strength. We are not trying to be alarmists. However, it is a bargaining point. The economic advantage is in our favor and we may exact certain pledges from them in return. What we are trying to say is that we should be aware of this as we put the cards on the table, and that the United States should not, in the guise of détente, overlook things that in fact are to its advantage and can be used in bargaining situations like this.

Mr. WHALEN. I think this leads to your second recommendation in which you say, in effect, we ought to slow down the SALT talks until this activity stops. This is a very serious suggestion. I am wondering if the threat posed by submarine visits is really worth taking that very significant step?

Mr. BLECHMAN. I might answer that. We don't mean to imply, at least I don't mean to imply we should slow down the SALT negotiations at this time. However, there has been a tendency in the United States for the past several years to overlook a number of things that the Soviet Union has undertaken because of the administration's tremendous need for success in its foreign policy, because of its domestic difficulties. This happened in 1970, for example, with regard to the Egypt-Israeli cease-fire on the Suez Canal that was violated manifestly by the Soviet Union; and again in 1972 and 1974 with the submarine business. I think the point is, when something new happens, the next time something happens, the United States should first publicize it to a much greater extent than it has. There has been a tendency to keep this sort of information out of the media. Second, the United States should protest to the Soviet Union about the incident and see what their reaction is. At some point, it might become necessary to take a counteraction, perhaps slowing down the negotiations. That is not something one has to do right now, however.

Mr. KAZEN. Excuse me. There is a record vote in progress on the floor. I think the committee will recess to give the members a chance to vote.

The subcommittee will recess for about 15 minutes.

[A short recess was taken.]

Mr. KAZEN. The subcommittee will resume its hearing.

When the subcommittee recessed, we were right in the middle of questioning.

Congressman, go right ahead.

Mr. WHALEN. Did we get the last question answered? If the reporter would repeat the last question.

[The pending question was read by the reporter.]

Mr. WHALEN. One final question, Mr. Chairman. I think we are all concerned with the possibility of Soviet submarines bearing nuclear weapons in our waters off the United States. By the same token, are not the American submarines operating in close proximity to Russia?

Mr. BLECHMAN. Yes, that is true. The fact that there are Soviet submarines off the coast which are capable of striking targets virtually anywhere in the United States are part of the reality we have to accept; just as they have missiles within the Soviet Union that can strike us. Having the base in Cuba doesn't change that situation. It just makes it a little cheaper for the Russians to pose that same threat. The important point, really the main point we are trying to make, is what we should be concerned with the Soviet encroachment on previous understandings. I think, if we are going to normalize our relations and I certainly hope that we do, it is important that the Russians come to understand that both sides have to make concessions and be concerned with the other's sensitivities.

Mr. WHALEN. I think it gets back to the question posed by Mr. Kazen, namely, your interpretation of the understanding. It is your belief that the understanding has been breeched?

Mr. BLECHMAN. It has been—the edges have been stepped upon.

Mr. WHALEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Just following up on Mr. Whalen's last question, when you talk about normalization, you are referring at least in an-

swering his question to relationships between the United States and Russia. I assume that you would include Cuba. Obviously, the Russians can't have a place in Cuba, unless Cuba wants that to happen.

Mr. BLECHMAN. Yes; that is generally the case. The Cubans—it is just as important, if not more so, to have explicit guarantees from the Cubans as to not permitting basing of the submarines.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. It might be more important. We aren't in the position that we have normalized relations with Cuba. We have to some extent done it with Russia.

Mr. BLECHMAN. Yes.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Do you think there is any kind of a possible relationship between the SALT talks and these submarine visits, some kind of a grand design, perhaps, on the part of the Soviets?

Mr. BLECHMAN. That has been suggested by some analysts. If you look at the pattern of the formal negotiations, there is some coincidence between the timing of the visits and critical points in the formal negotiations. And that leads to some speculation that the Soviets were creating a bargaining chip for themselves. I tend to discount that myself. Mainly because if you read John Newhouse's books on the SALT negotiations, the more important negotiations were the back-channel talks between Kissinger; Gromyko and Dobrynin. The timing there was different and the submarine visits would have been too late to affect these negotiations.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. You say on page 2 of your paper, most significantly two of these visits were submarines armed with strategic missiles.

How do we know that? Was this reported as well as the visit itself?

Mr. BLECHMAN. Well, the submarine itself, the Golf class is known as a strategic submarine. It carries three ballistic missiles that are considered to be designed to strike fixed land targets.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. We assumed it was that kind of a submarine. It had that usual—

Mr. BLECHMAN. Yes.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Nothing was said about that at the time of the visit?

Mr. BLECHMAN. No.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. On the next page, you're talking about the visit, you say the visit was not announced beforehand, the behavior of the accompanying vessels indicated Soviet officials had some concern for the implications of the visit. What kind of behavior was that?

Mr. BLECHMAN. Well, what we got out of the hearings held before this subcommittee, was that the tender put in at the bay first, and the next day the destroyer appeared there, and then on the following day, the destroyer put out to sea, rendezvoused with the submarine and accompanied it back into the base. They all didn't just steam down from the Atlantic and sail in. There were preparations going on.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I have no further questions.

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL [presiding]. First, let me apologize to the witnesses. I am sorry we were delayed on the House floor. I had a bill with which I unfortunately did not succeed.

I want to be clear in my own mind as to what both of you are saying. Should Cuba be considered as an isolated matter or with reference to world politics and global strategy, East-West?

Mr. BLECHMAN. No, not at all. It is not isolated. I guess that is sort of the point. Because of our desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union in the broadest sense and in certain other specifics, such as the SALT talks, the United States has tended to discount the importance of these visits, and so our policy has tended to be isolated—to say, “Oh, that’s all right, it is not very important, we have all these other good things happening in our relations.” However, we feel that the Soviet Union is taking advantage of that sentiment.

Mr. FASCELL. So Soviet activity should be read in light of Soviet activity worldwide and the U.S. reaction or action with respect to Cuba should be read the same way?

Ms. LEVINSON. In fact, we did say that this specific probing of an understanding had broader implications for the other understanding we had with the Soviets. If because of détente we condone this conduct in any area—that is to say we will overlook this one violation because of its relative insignificance—we will, in fact, lessen the force of all our verbal statements and commitments.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, let me rephrase it this way. Should Soviet activity or penetration or however it is characterized, military or otherwise in the Caribbean be read any differently than in the Mediterranean or Indian Ocean or anyplace else?

Mr. BLECHMAN. No, not at all. It follows sort of a consistent pattern, if you study their naval deployments worldwide. They have been in a steady course of expanding this presence overseas. They began in the Mediterranean, then began to increase their operations in the Atlantic, and started in the Caribbean since the 1969 visit. It is very much a part of this pattern and should be understood that way.

Mr. FASCELL. If the crisis in the Middle East motivated the Russians to increase the Mediterranean fleet by 90 vessels which motivated us to increase our 6th Fleet capability to equal that or to be near that, as I see it, we would be reacting in a political-military fashion which has become normal in East-West confrontations. If that is true, what is our crisis in the Caribbean?

Ms. LEVINSON. We are essentially endorsing their behavior by not reacting at all.

Mr. FASCELL. We are saying military and economic penetration into the Western Hemisphere is OK, particularly as applies to Cuba, of course?

Mr. BLECHMAN. There are some things that are perfectly normal, commonly accepted forms of behavior these days. There is really—you can’t protest about military assistance, for example. However, some other things are more questionable; particularly in this case, the visit by submarines in apparent contradiction to a previous undertaking on their part. We don’t mean to say that every time a Soviet ship comes into the Caribbean the United States should scramble its strategic bombers, of course not.

Mr. FASCELL. What you’re saying is that the long established pattern tells us something?

Mr. BLECHMAN. We are saying they are establishing this pattern and that it is particularly troubling for submarines because there was

that confrontation in 1970 and there were some undertakings by each side. It behooves us to make a protest at some point in this process.

Mr. FASCELL. I may be covering a lot of ground that has been covered before but what was your understanding of the "understanding?"

Mr. BLECHMAN. It is our understanding that the United States objected to the introduction of any strategic weapon in Cuba. It didn't matter whether the missiles were on nuclear-powered boats or diesel-powered boats. In fact, the military advantage is greater for the diesel-powered submarines than it is for nuclear-powered submarines.

Now, however, the administration has narrowed its interpretation of the agreement to apply only to nuclear-powered submarines and only to nuclear-powered submarines carrying strategic missiles, so we feel that they have been narrowing the scope of the agreement.

Mr. FASCELL. How do you read that? What difference does it make?

Mr. BLECHMAN. The difference is that this can only encourage the Soviets to continue encroaching upon the agreement. So far they have gotten no reaction. According to public sources, we state that Golf class—

Mr. FASCELL. 1974 visit or 1972?

Mr. BLECHMAN. 1974. There was a Defense press release showing the task force on the way south. But that was about all. It wasn't even mentioned in the American press anywhere that we could find.

Mr. FASCELL. How should the U.S. Government react or should it react in cases of that kind? What should we do if we are not going to permit, by our tacit consent, encroachment on an "understanding?"

Mr. BLECHMAN. We feel first that the United States should give greater publicity to what the Soviets are doing in that region.

Mr. FASCELL. A statement by a highly placed official or authoritative source?

Mr. BLECHMAN. Yes. Second, certainly, we shouldn't discount the importance of the visits. We should alert the Soviets in a public fashion, even if we feel they are not directly violating an agreement, that they are pushing a little bit upon it and we are still concerned as to what they are doing in that area. Then, depending on what exactly they do there—you know, did this submarine go to Cienfuegos and make use of those facilities—we can't tell that from public sources. If it did, if they start establishing a regular patrol from Cienfuegos—going into Cienfuegos and back out to the mid-Atlantic patrol area and then returning to Cienfuegos—that is something we should be quite concerned about.

Mr. FASCELL. It would seem to me that the United States is softening our response or attitude toward Soviet activity in the Caribbean and that makes it just that much more difficult, if I understood you correctly, to deal with Soviets on all matters.

Mr. BLECHMAN. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. In addition to the fact that they slowly are encroaching on what was an "understanding." That's all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KAZEN. Are there any further questions?

Doctor, your list of visits does not show that a ballistic submarine has visited Cienfuegos?

Mr. BLECHMAN. No, that has never been reported, that it has done that. There was, however, this 3-week period that the submarine was

somewhere in the Caribbean. One cannot tell from public sources where the submarine was. We have no access to classified material. That is the sort of thing the subcommittee should ask the Government witnesses tomorrow.

Mr. KAZEN. All right.

Thank you both very much. We appreciate your being here and taking the time out and we apologize to you for the inconvenience during this hearing.

If there is no further business before this subcommittee, we will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m. the subcommittee was adjourned.]

SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1974

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, at 10 a.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FASCELL. This morning the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee continues our series of hearings on Soviet activities in Cuba and related issues.

Yesterday, the subcommittee heard testimony from two experts from the Brookings Institution on the political implications of Soviet submarine visits to Cuba. Today, we will further explore that issue and others with representatives from the Defense Intelligence Agency.

As in previous years we are hearing DIA's testimony in executive session because of the classified nature of the information to be discussed. We do, however, intend to declassify as much of the information as possible in order to provide the public with the maximum amount of information.

Over the years the Defense Intelligence Agency has been most cooperative and the subcommittee is most appreciative.

Our witnesses today are:

Lincoln D. Faurer, Major General, USAF, Deputy Director for Intelligence, DIA.

Paul Wallner, Latin American analyst, DIA.

Susan E. Rogers, Lieutenant (jg.), U.S. Navy, Soviet area analyst, DIA.

Gary McClellan, DIA.

General, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. LINCOLN D. FAURER, U.S. AIR FORCE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Maj. Gen. Lincoln David Faurer is the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency.

General Faurer was born in Medford, Mass., on February 7, 1928. His education includes Cornell University and a graduate from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., in 1950 with B.S. degree and a commission as second lieutenant;

a Masters in engineering management from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, N.Y., in 1964 and a Masters in international affairs from the George Washington University, Washington, D.C., in 1968.

After graduation from the Academy, General Faurer has had a long and impressive military career to include such assignments as being assigned Director, J-2, U.S. Southern Command, Canal Zone, and Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence with Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, and last but not least in his present capacity as the Deputy Director for Intelligence, DIA.

His military decorations and awards include the Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Service Commendation Medal, and the Air Force Commendation Medal with one oak leaf cluster.

General FAURER. Mr. Chairman, it is our intention to update you on the development concerning naval activities in Cuban waters; Soviet and Cuban activity in Latin America; and other developments in the region. Since our presentation to your subcommittee last year, there have been two additional Soviet naval deployments to Cuba, and the Soviet Union has continued its program of military and economic assistance to the Castro government. The degree and type of Cuban support to insurgent and terrorist groups in Latin America continue to decline. Soviet tank deliveries to Peru and that country's military modernization effort have raised the possibility of conflict with Chile. Increasing terrorism in Argentina since Juan Peron's death on July 1 has caused widespread instability. I assure you that we in the Defense Intelligence Agency recognize the importance of developments in this area and keep close watch on activities in Latin America.

Mr. FASCELL. Let me go through this formality. In order to make this an executive session of the subcommittee, the Chair would entertain a motion at this point to make this an executive session before we proceed.

Mr. GROSS. I so move.

Mr. FASCELL. We have to call the roll. The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. FINLEY. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Aye.

Mr. FINLEY. Mr. Kazen.

[No response.]

Mr. FINLEY. Mr. Rosenthal.

[No response.]

Mr. FINLEY. Mr. Taylor

[No response.]

Mr. FINLEY. Mr. Harrington.

Mr. HARRINGTON. I prefer not to, but if you need it.

Mr. FASCELL. I don't think it has to be unanimous.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Nay.

Mr. FINLEY. Mr. Steele.

[No response.]

Mr. FINLEY. Mr. Gross.

Mr. GROSS. Aye.

Mr. FINLEY. Mr. Whalen.

Mr. WHALEN. Aye.

Mr. FINLEY. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Aye.

Mr. FINLEY. Four in favor of closing the meeting and one opposed, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. General, you may proceed.

General FAURER. Our presentation will follow the pattern of last year. We have two specific briefings to offer. The first will discuss Soviet naval activities in Cuban waters, and the second will review activities in Cuba, Castro's support of insurgency and activities elsewhere in Latin America.

Additionally, the latter briefing will include discussion of the recent OAS meeting and the situation between Peru and Chile.

Mr. FASCELL. Good.

General FAURER. The overall classification is secret, but we are prepared to sanitize the transcript so it may be published in open record if you so desire.

The first briefer will be Lt. (jg.) Susan Rogers.

STATEMENT OF LT. (JG.) SUSAN ROGERS, U.S. NAVY, SOVIET AREA ANALYST, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Lieutenant ROGERS. This portion of this morning's briefing on Soviet activities in Latin America will cover naval deployments, naval air deployments, and the midshipmen cruise to Latin America. Soviet naval deployments to Cuba commenced during the summer of 1969. These deployments have been covered in previous briefings with you.

The composition of these deployments normally consists of two surface combatants, usually destroyers or cruisers, an auxiliary, an intelligence collector, and at least one submarine. The Soviets have used some of their most modern surface combatants and submarines for Cuban deployments which include: The Kresta-II guided-missile light cruiser, one of the newest Soviet surface combatant types, which has improved antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities and is armed with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles; the Kashin class guided-missile frigate, which has an ASW capability and is armed with surface-to-air missiles; the Echo-II diesel-powered guided-missile submarine which has eight SS-N-3 cruise missiles with a range of [security deletion] nautical miles, and the Golf-II diesel-powered ballistic-missile submarine, which has three SS-N-5 ballistic missiles with a range of 700 nautical miles. This was the first Soviet ballistic-missile submarine to visit a port outside the Soviet Union. Significant developments during these deployments include the introduction of a nuclear-attack submarine in 1969, the first combined Soviet-Cuban ASW exercises in 1970. The introduction of the first ballistic-missile submarine in 1972, and the first appearance of a Kresta-II guided-missile light cruiser in the Caribbean in 1973.

Turning to activity of this year, the Soviets have conducted their 11th and 12th deployments since we last appeared before this subcommittee. On the 11th deployment, two Kresta guided-missile destroyers, one Golf-II class submarine, and a merchant tanker visited Havana. Again you will notice the presence of a ballistic-missile submarine. This is the first visit to Havana by a ballistic-missile submarine.

Additionally, a deployed AGI intelligence collector joined the group in Havana on April 29 and remained there until May 5 when she resumed the east coast patrol. During the 11th deployment they also visited the Port of Cienfuegos. They conducted antisubmarine warfare

exercises with Cuban naval forces off Mariel. [Security deletion.] On May 30, the units departed Cienfuegos and returned to Soviet waters.

Turning to the 12th deployment, it commenced on September 24 and consisted of two Kresta-II units. Additionally, a deployed AGI made a 7-day port visit to Havana prior to resuming its U.S. east coast patrol on October 19. [Security deletion.] The Foxtrot-class submarine rendezvoused with an Ugra-class submarine tender north of the Florida Straits and they made a slow transit across the Atlantic.

[Security deletion.] The subtender that transited with the Foxtrot class submarine had previously conducted an annual midshipman cruise with a flag officer and several hundred midshipmen on board. She transited the Caribbean and made port calls at Cartagena and Havana prior to returning to home waters.

The two Krestas departed Havana 6 days after their arrival and made a shallow incursion into the Gulf of Mexico. After approximately 3 days of operations, they returned to Havana on October 4. On October 24, the two Krestas and the replenishment oiler departed Havana and entered Cienfuegos 4 days later. The Kresta group remained there until November 11, when they departed Cuban waters via the Windward Passage.

Turning now to naval air activity, the Soviets have also conducted air deployments to Cuba. When we last briefed you, 12 deployments had been completed. Since that time four additional deployments have been conducted. TU-95/Bear Delta naval reconnaissance aircraft fly from a Northern Fleet base to Havana's Jose Marti Airport. They frequently conduct reconnaissance flights over U.S. ships transiting the Atlantic while en route to Cuba and while operating from there.

Moving to our final section, a subtender transited the Pacific and conducted an annual deployment to Latin America where they made port calls to Callao and Guayaquil prior to returning to the Sea of Japan.

In conclusion, the Soviets have continued to introduce some of their most modern combatants and weapons, including three types of submarines and three types of surface combatants, as well as their primary long-range naval aircraft.

Their main objectives seems to be to convince the Western Hemisphere and particularly the United States that the Soviets can periodically operate in ocean areas close to the United States.

This ends my portion of the briefing, gentlemen.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Lieutenant.

STATEMENT OF PAUL WALLNER, LATIN AMERICAN ANALYST, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. WALLNER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

Soviet military aid to Cuba has surpassed [security deletion] million and this year's assistance will be at about the same level as 1973. Since our last appearance before the subcommittee, the major Soviet military delivery has been [security deletion] Mig-21 Fighters. [Security deletion.] These aircraft are likely replacements for older fighters being phased out by the Cubans.

In addition [security deletion] the navy has received other new deliveries. [Security deletion.] Cuba apparently is having trouble maintaining some of its older naval units. [Security deletion.] Although the requirement for spare parts for other Cuban subchasers is likely behind this development, other deliveries [security deletion] can be expected [security deletion].

Elsewhere in the navy, two small landing craft were shipped to the island in September. This arrival increases the number of T-4 Landing Craft to [security deletion] and gives the Cubans a start on development of an amphibious capability.

In the air defense system, the Cubans have begun what may be a major shift in their surface-to-air missiles. Construction on [security deletion] new sites has been initiated during the past 15 months. [Security deletion] and construction at all [security deletion] locations has proceeded slowly.

[Security deletion] this construction could be the initial stages of a shift from key location coverage to island-wide SAM coverage.

The artillery positions and ammunition revetments located near the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo have not been occupied or maintained. [Security deletion] the positions have been allowed to go unattended. [Security deletion.] The Cubans apparently have decided to bide their time with respect to the Guantanamo Naval Base issue.

In Cienfuegos, the Soviet naval support facility around Cayo Alcatraz remains operational with only a submarine tender required to provide forward servicing to Soviet naval units. [Security deletion.] At any rate, Cayo Alcatraz remains ready for exclusive Soviet use any time they desire.

Soviet economic aid to Cuba since 1960 totals almost \$5 billion. Most of the 1974 economic aid has been in the form of development assistance for the sugar and nickel industries. The Cubans, meanwhile, have expanded trade with other Latin American countries. Argentina, Venezuela, and Honduras have been forthcoming in this regard and there are indications that Mexico may sell the Castro government some of her new-found oil.

Soaring prices for sugar should provide Cuba with additional cash revenue of about \$1 billion this year. This windfall is likely to provide the impetus for more economic activity with Latin America and the West. Soviet assistance, the surge in world sugar prices, and increased trade activity with the Free World have placed the Cuban economy in its best position since Castro assumed power.

In political activities, the most significant development was the failure of the OAS to remove the sanctions against Cuba in Ecuador earlier this month. [Security deletion] Mexico, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Argentina supported removal of the sanctions, while Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay voted against the measure. Brazil, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti, and the United States abstained, their votes provided the margin of defeat.

The largely unsuccessful economic blockade, future credibility of the OAS, and Cuba's reduced interest in supporting subversion had been cited as reasons for removing the sanctions. Costa Rica, Vene-

zuela, and Colombia were instrumental in setting up the Quito meeting. Had the sanctions measure received the necessary two-thirds majority, each member nation would have had the option to pursue its own course with regard to Cuba. [Security deletion.]

Internally, the first elections in Cuba since Castro came to power were held in Matanzas Province this past summer. Delegates to an entity called the Organ of People's Power were elected in what is officially called an experiment. Apparently the Organ of People's Power will be under the direct tutelage of the Cuban Communist Party. Representatives from the equivalents of ward, city, municipality, and provincial levels were named. The Organ is allegedly aimed at improving control of the production and service organizations within the various echelons of Cuban society. Official statements on the elections point out that if the Organ is successful, the process will be expanded and a National People's Organ may be established by 1976. In spite of these qualifications, the elections have given some Cubans their first taste of democracy.

Turning to Cuban export of revolution, we see a continuing decline in both the level and type of Cuban subversive support. Only indirect support in the form of guerrilla training was provided to insurgents from Uruguay, Chile and Honduras during the past year. [Security deletion.]

Expanding diplomatic relations with Latin American nations has played an important part in the decline of subversive support. In August, Panama became the latest country to renew ties with Cuba and others are sure to follow. Other factors supporting the reduction in Cuban export of revolution are [security deletion] ineffective subversive organizations [security deletion] strong and effective counter-insurgency moves by local security forces, and higher internal priorities in Cuba.

In addition, most subversive organizations in the region face poor prospects for growth or expansion over the next few years. [Security deletion.] We believe that none of these insurgent groups will pose a serious threat to the respective governments in the foreseeable future.

Castro has continued to provide military and security support to countries and guerrilla groups in other regions of the world. In Africa, remnants of Cuban support can still be found in the Republic of the Congo and Guinea. In the Middle East, [security deletion].

In addition, there are solid indications that [security deletion] Cuban armored and medical personnel were detailed to Syria during the last hostilities, [security deletion]. It is believed that this latter group has since returned to Cuba.

[Security deletion.] Because many countries continue to favor lifting the OAS sanctions against Cuba, and anti-U.S. sentiment is increasing in many countries, the Cuban leader will probably do all he can to sustain his improved international image. He is not expected, however, to completely sever his ties with revolutionary organizations.

Communist diplomatic efforts in Latin America have increased significantly in recent years. Trinidad and Tobago established ties with the Soviet Union in June of this year and [security deletion]. Counting Cuba, there are now 13 Soviet diplomatic missions in the region. Trade and cultural exchanges and negotiations between the Soviet

Union and Latin countries, although still minimal, are also on the increase.

Eastern European countries are also striving to improve and expand their official relations in Latin America. Poland and Romania, for example, have diplomatic, trade or consular representation in 18 different Latin American countries. The People's Republic of China has successfully established relations with Brazil, Venezuela, and Trinidad and Tobago during the past year. Despite this substantial Communist effort, the reactions have been mixed. [Security deletion.]

From a military standpoint, the most significant development in the area has been the shipment of Soviet T-55 tanks to Peru. As many as [security deletion] have probably been sent to Peru in the first Soviet military delivery to the region outside of Cuba. This development has focused attention on the growing possibility of open conflict with Chile over territory lost by Peru nearly 100 years ago in the war of the Pacific. This graphic, which shows [security deletion].

In addition, Peru's extensive modernization program over the past several years [security deletion]. Planned military acquisitions by Peru and Chile tend to support deep suspicions on both sides. [Security deletion.] Leaders of the countries military governments have tried to discount the possibility of war in public statements, but most observers believe that the long-standing suspicion will remain.

[Security deletion.] Peru is faced with several deterrents working against the initiation of hostilities. The reformist military regime in Lima [security deletion]. Brazil's considerable military power and their self-expressed desire to develop the region on Peru's border are also causing concern in Lima.

In addition, [security deletion].

Finally, the need for improvement in the socio-economic situation and the government's desire to initiate additional reforms also mitigate against aggressive action. [Security deletion.]

The internal situation in Chile during the past year has been a mixed package. On the one hand, the military junta is genuinely striving for some form of political and economic stability but, conversely, appears unable to make significant inroads in either field.

Highlighting the year on the positive side has been the release and reduced sentences for third country nationals and political detainees. Over 8,000 citizens of other countries have been allowed to return home and such prominent political prisoners as President Allende's Minister of Defense Orlando Letelier (Leh-TEL-yay) have been freed. Junta President General Pinochet was named Chief of State in a July decree which virtually secured his domination of the government for the foreseeable future.

Elsewhere in the government, the cabinet reorganization in July left all but 2 of 16 positions in military hands. Only the Ministries of Finance and Economy were retained under civilian leadership, despite continuing economic problems. High inflation, which will probably exceed 300 percent for 1974, remains the primary economic difficulty. The Government has tried to help by granting periodic wage increases and direct assistance to the unemployed but these moves are likely to merely temporize the situation. To complicate matters, Chile's balance of trade has received sharp setbacks in the past year

because of declining copper prices and soaring food and oil costs. [Security deletion.]

In Argentina, [security deletion]. Two insurgent organizations have caused the instability. The Marxist People's Revolutionary Army has engaged in kidnappings and assassinations of army officers. The leftist Montoneros have conducted terrorists actions against government officials. These two groups have dramatically increased the level of violence which has resulted in more than 140 political deaths in the 4 months since Mrs. Peron took office. [Security deletion.]

Army Chief General Anaya has declared a hands-off policy, but [security deletion].

[Security deletion] the attempted kidnaping of a USIS official in April has been the only incident to date. President Peron recently has been taking a harder line against terrorism than did her late husband, a policy which has met with only limited success. The state of siege and limiting of constitutional freedoms initiated on November 6 is the latest and most significant government action. [Security deletion.] In this environment, Argentina will demand a good deal of our attention in the coming months.

This concludes my portion on the briefing.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you.

General FAURER. This concludes our prepared presentation.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you.

In Argentina what kind of pressure is the American diplomatic mission under?

Mr. WALLNER. They are under pressure to watch their activities very closely. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Has our Ambassador been targeted?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Is that the reason he travels around with a bulletproof car and with guards everywhere he goes?

Mr. WALLNER. That is part of the reason, personal security.

Mr. FASCELL. Is that the reason he is in the United States today?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir. He is here for a midtour debriefing.

Mr. FASCELL. Who else has been targeted in the American diplomatic mission?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Would you outline the activities and organization of our military group mission in Argentina?

Mr. WALLNER. I am not familiar with the details of it. I believe it is about 10 people that are to assist in military assistance and training.

General FAURER. I think the number is higher than that but I think that is essentially the mission.

Mr. FASCELL. That group is just for training, isn't it? I don't recall that we have any program with Argentina.

Mr. WALLNER. Their mission is to represent the Department of Defense in all matters relating to security assistance. This includes the management of grant MAP training, supervision of previously furnished—the coordination of Foreign Military Sales—both cash and credit, and functioning as the primary liaison between United States and Argentina defense establishments in all mutual security matters.

Mr. FASCELL. This targeting procedure is strictly from the two left groups.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir. Primarily the ERP. The Montoneros seem to be more interested in Argentine Government and security forces.

Mr. FASCELL. Are these the same groups that have been attacking American businessmen, attacking them and holding them for ransom?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir, that is the ERP, primarily.

Mr. FASCELL. Are you familiar with how much decline there has been in American business development in Argentina as a result of the terrorist activities?

Mr. WALLNER. Not the specific details but I do know it has declined substantially in terms of numbers of American businessmen there. They are going elsewhere, to Brazil and Uruguay and operating from there to Buenos Aires.

Mr. FASCELL. How about any reduction of U.S. Government personnel in Argentina? Has that been significant?

General FAURER. There has been a significant reduction in U.S. official presence in Argentina because of the security situation. In the case of our Military Group, manning was temporarily reduced last July from 29 to the current level of 20. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. The number of students in the American school there has been reduced from 1,300 to about 300. How did that happen?

Mr. WALLNER. Most of these students are children of American businessmen. That is how that happened.

Mr. FASCELL. Is that school in any danger? Are the children in any danger?

Mr. WALLNER. I have seen nothing to indicate that they are specifically.

With respect to the general situation [security deletion].

Mr. FASCELL. That is the first time, though, isn't it?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir, so it could extend from there to a threat to Americans.

Mr. FASCELL. Just recently they killed some women and children, didn't they?

STATEMENT OF GARY McCLELLAN, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. McCLELLAN. No; I have not heard of any. There have been some wives killed during assassinations of army officers. When General Prats was assassinated, when his car blew up, his wife was also in the car.

Mr. FASCELL. How about assassination of women lawyers who are representing some of the leftist terrorists?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Yes, that happened [security deletion].

Mr. FASCELL. They were picking them off from the right side.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WALLNER. In retaliation. It is a very unstable internal situation, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. You have the right and the left taking pot-shots at each other, just as it was in Guatemala.

Mr. WALLNER. To a higher degree, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. I can see that.

At one time the Soviets were very, very much interested in economic penetration of Argentina. Is there any evidence that a relationship exists between the leftist organizations and Soviet desires?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.] They, the Soviets, seem to be more open. They go in with legitimate delegations. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. That is certainly good news, because at one time they seemed to have their eyes set on all the beef production and all the oil and a few other things.

Mr. GROSS.

Mr. GROSS. What is Cuba doing by way of support in the Congo?

Mr. WALLNER. They have a small number of military advisers who are training the security elements in the Congo. They have been there for several years. I believe in the mid-sixties there was probably a maximum of about 60 Cubans involved. It has gradually declined and now [security deletion]. They are training their police and security forces.

Mr. GROSS. Are the Chinese in there, too?

Mr. WALLNER. Africa is not my area. I cannot answer that question.

Mr. GROSS. The T-55's—I believe you said, the T-55 tanks are going to Peru. Are they going directly from the Soviet Union or are they going through Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GROSS. Are we going to be able to remain in Argentina? That is American business?

Mr. WALLNER. I did not understand, sir.

Mr. GROSS. American business representatives, are they going to be able to remain in Argentina?

Mr. WALLNER. That is a very good question. I think that they will remain.

Mr. GROSS. In other words, are we going to be able to continue to carry on any kind of real trade relations with Argentina?

Mr. WALLNER. I believe we will, [security deletion]. And it does not seem to me that terrorism can continue at this level—or get higher—and still have any kind of a meaningful relationship.

General FAURER. The answer to your question lies much in whether we think the Argentine Government is going to be able to get the terrorist situation back under control. I guess that while one speaks with very little assurance there we think they would. [Security deletion.]

So while the situation is different there is enough similarity that I think the terrorist situation should decrease.

Mr. GROSS. To what extent is Cuba involved, if any, in this terrorism in Argentina?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.] Cuba has excellent trade and diplomatic relations with Argentina and they do not want to jeopardize these.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Harrington.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Do you know who is responsible for the death of General Prats?

Mr. WALLNER. We are not sure, sir.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Which group was responsible for the death of General Prats?

Mr. WALLNER. We just do not have any information, and I am just speculating, to be very honest [security deletion].

Mr. HARRINGTON. Not a Chilean group?

Mr. WALLNER. We have no evidence, although that is a possibility. As has been mentioned, his wife was also killed in the incident.

Mr. HARRINGTON. What has our role been in the situation you described to Congressman Fascell as far as pessimism that comes from current prospects in Argentina for some stability? What have we been doing?

Mr. WALLNER. What have we been doing?

I honestly don't know, sir. I presume the State Department has been attempting to keep their people and all U.S. citizens in this country apprised of the situation, [security deletion].

General FAURER. We have no direct interface with what is going on from this end. I think we speak without much knowledge of what overtures our Government is making.

Mr. HARRINGTON. There is no exchange of information. You don't have that knowledge of what the other facets of the executive branch would be doing in general?

General FAURER. It tends to be a somewhat less than equal exchange. I don't know if there is any conscious decision to keep us uninformed but our interaction tends to be one of we in intelligence supplying information to the other bodies of Government deciding what actions to take. So when they ask us to come and talk, we do, but there is no feedback.

Mr. HARRINGTON. So you are not in position to comment on the National Security Council's action or lack thereof that we are adopting or taking a stance toward the conditions you described in Argentina?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Does this limit the effectiveness of what you can provide us with by way of information? Is it a situation you would prefer to see corrected?

General FAURER. I think one could hypothesize in a given set of circumstances that absence of knowledge of what our Government is doing might hamper our interpretation of intelligence, but it is a hypothetical type of answer. I know of nothing in this specific instance that would cause me to say we feel handicapped, that we suspect there are actions that if we knew more about we could better tell what was going on. I am not conscious of that feeling in this instance but hypothetically I would agree with what you say.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Does our Government's position recently make any sense to you?

Mr. WALLNER. Again I personally am not professionally qualified to answer that.

Mr. HARRINGTON. I am not professionally qualified to ask it but on that level I would like an answer.

Mr. WALLNER. I will give it to you on that level. I think what we were trying to do in Quito by abstaining and by not making our position known until the 11th hour was to encourage the other members of the OAS to stand up and be counted. [Security deletion.]

General FAURER. I find it interesting in reading appraisals of that OAS action to note both an optimistic interpretation and a pessimistic interpretation. There is the obvious pessimistic one that asserts the deathknell of the OAS has been sounded by their failure to act in this case. But there is also an optimistic interpretation that would be put on it suggesting that the countries will now go home, several of them at least, encouraged to do a sort of responsible reassessment of the role

that some central organization must play in Latin America and what the relationship of the United States to that organization must be.

The posture for recent years has been one basically of criticism on the part of Latin America without facing up to many of the problems. One could think that the OAS vote will drive at least a few of the countries to think responsibly about it [security deletion].

If that optimistic view were to be a correct one then it could be argued that the U.S. position in Quito would turn out to have been very wise. If the pessimistic view prevails, one might second-guess.

Mr. HARRINGTON. The tenor of all of this seems to be in isolation from what—5 years, at least—from some rhetoric would have me believe of an interest in furthering relations with countries whose general organization may be considered left or the description might be harsher, and suggest they are closed societies as distinguished from “free world” that creeps into the report this morning.

Does this puzzle you at all when you begin to talk about visits of the Soviet fleet and the air wings to Cuba? Is it at odds or variance with what has been in a broad sense expressed interest, at least a change in broad policy and preoccupation with describing cruises of midshipmen to Cuba or overflights, as Lieutenant Rogers indicated, American vessels crossing back and forth.

I assume if you were to transpose names of countries and situations that you could easily draw entirely opposite conclusions in different parts of the world. But I am puzzled about why this preoccupation with things I would view entirely in keeping with nation states—as long as they last as nation states—might consider to be their normal extension of their role. We do it. We are bothered by it. Does it make sense to continue? Are you looking at the Brazilians and their policies toward their neighbor as closely as you are looking at Cuba or other places of that kind?

Mr. FASCELL. I think part of that, Mr. Harrington, is the result of the preoccupation of this subcommittee. I think DIA is just simply being responsive to a request to brief us on this subject.

Mr. HARRINGTON. But in my own mind there is a certain absence of intellectual content of what is said about conclusions to be drawn.

General FAURER. Do I understand the thrust of your question is why our preoccupation with principally Soviet expressions of interest or concern, or awareness, or development in this hemisphere and why we would watch it in some detail and note it when as individual actions they are not that strange, and we would perhaps pursue similar actions elsewhere in the world ourselves?

Mr. HARRINGTON. That is part of it. And probably a better summarization than I was able to give. But it goes beyond that, to just wondering why we continue headed in this general direction when what we have been trying to do with our people in general is encourage heightening of these ominous overtones that can be drawn by inference from that passive recitation in these events as to which they are a part, in a larger sense, of a picture of continued subdued aggression.

Does that kind of language, the semantics used, make any sense at all to subtly feed the subcommittee? I think the term “free world” comes to mind. Free world where? Chile? Argentina? Peru? Why do we have this kind of language? Why these semantics in 1970? I can understand it in the sixties and in the fifties.

General FAURER. I guess perhaps at the root of our concern is the acceptance that if there is a friend-enemy relationship in the world, despite détente, the Soviets would tend to fall into the enemy as opposed to friend camp. And it is important to us where they establish spheres of influence, to use an old term, or establish areas of concern because it matters later sometimes in totally unrelated circumstances judging what each of the superpowers is doing, where legitimate areas of concern lie. I think they watch us for our establishment of concern in areas of the world as we watch them. And I think they view us in the same general "enemy" context that I am suggesting we view them, despite détente and despite the fact that this term "enemy" no longer carries quite the sense of urgency that it might have 20 years ago, I don't think it has gone away.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Thank you for letting me overstep my time.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Do we have any intelligence activity in Argentina that gives us any forewarning of activities of these guerrilla groups?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. [Security deletion.]

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Now, why has the military been reluctant to act?

Mr. WALLNER. In Argentina?

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Yes.

Mr. WALLNER. The military turned over power to Juan Peron last year after staying in power for 7 years under General Lamusse, and they were very unpopular during this 7 years, [security deletion].

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. So they are leaving it up to the Government itself—

Mr. WALLNER. That is correct. From the government standpoint the civilian sector is still somewhat suspicious about the military. [Security deletion.]

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. So it is a question of who is going to take the initiative rather than what will be done.

Mr. WALLNER. Exactly. Who and how.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. And I understand from what you say you feel they will.

Mr. WALLNER. I believe that is the only solution. That is the only way they are going to control it, sir.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. What is the attitude of the Peruvian Government and the Peruvian people toward the United States at this point?

Mr. WALLNER. Well, I think it is an attitude of independence. [Security deletion.] We certainly see good evidence of this in their purchases of military hardware; not only have they gone to the Soviet Union but they have gone to a wide variety of other countries.

I think we see an indication of this in their establishment of reform programs in the society. The Government and the hierarchy I think are definitely heading in this direction [security deletion]. And they have made substantial progress.

The people? That is difficult to zero in on. Perhaps they have some of that same feeling but then again it might be more one of indifference. As long as they can see some progress they will take the Government's word for how it is being accomplished.

General FAURER. If I could expand your question to include the military, and suggest there is at least a slight differentiation between it and the Government. I would like to offer that I think the military, despite several years of frustration and wanting more arms than we were able to provide them, the military attitude is still one of friendliness toward the United States. I think probably not quite as strong now as it would have been a year or two ago had we been able to lift the arms sale problem, but, nevertheless, one of being essentially pro-United States; and probably found themselves embarking on the Soviet program with some misgivings at the time, but little choice.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Yesterday we had some testimony, and I guess you would call it speculation, that there might be a difference between the viewpoint of the Soviet navy and the Soviet political leadership with regard to business to Cuba.

I know you were here, Lieutenant. Would you care to comment on that? That was interesting.

General FAURER. I found that a preposterous suggestion.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I did too. I don't think anybody does anything in the Soviet Union without political leadership.

General FAURER. We have no indication that such a statement could be true, either in that literal context in which it was used, or any other similar military versus political context.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Obviously any such visits could not take place—I suppose they could take place without the consent of the Cuban Government—but there is no evidence that they have.

General FAURER. No.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I have no further questions.

Mr. FASCELL. Why would the [security deletion] want to have killed General Prats, who was in exile? [Security deletion.]

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.] As I say, that is my personal speculation. I have no evidence to support that.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you agree that the Soviets have been undertaking a deliberate probing of U.S. resolution by the changes in the kinds of the subs they have been sending to Cuba.

General FAURER. I think our difficulty in answering that kind of question is one of degree. We would have no trouble, as we briefed already, suggesting that there is an apparent gradual enlargement on the part of the Soviets of their presence there. To what extent that means they are trying to encroach upon agreements, and so on, it is difficult for us to answer. But we are not aware of the agreements in any detail. Certainly it gives that impression to us, there is a deliberate intention to gradually make their presence larger and larger.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you think that same kind of interpretation could be put on the subject by our allies or anybody else, for that matter?

And if so—certainly that is a distinct possibility—how substantial is this effort to discredit or reduce credibility of the United States?

General FAURER. I personally do not believe that the principal purpose of the Soviet increasing presence here is to deny great U.S. will. I would like the analyst to add his comment because he might disagree with me. But I would suggest the Soviet has their eyes in two directions as they increase their presence. [Security deletion.]

I think the other direction in which they are looking is toward Latin America. They are establishing a visible development and concern

[security deletion] which enhances all of their other more subtle and discreet actions to establish a greater role in Latin America.

Mr. FASCELL. Both political and economic or otherwise.

General FAURER. Yes, sir.

Mr. WALLNER. And military.

Mr. FASCELL. During the 11th deployment what was the class of the ballistic subs which visited?

Lieutenant ROGERS. The Golf-II.

Mr. FASCELL. What are its capabilities?

Lieutenant ROGERS. It has three SS-N-5 ballistic missiles with a range of 700 nautical miles.

Mr. FASCELL. Had this class sub visited before?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Lieutenant ROGERS. Yes; during the eighth deployment.

Mr. FASCELL. Did the ballistic sub visit Cienfuegos?

Mr. WALLNER. In the 11th deployment I believe it did, but it did not in the earlier deployments.

Mr. FASCELL. So this was the first time.

Mr. WALLNER. In Cienfuegos.

Mr. FASCELL. Has the information on the dates and port visits of the ballistic sub been made public?

Mr. WALLNER. It has been made public by the article by the Brookings people yesterday.

Mr. McCLELLAN. The last visit was publicly announced.

General FAURER: The 11th deployment was made public by Tass. But the previous deployment is not public other than as it has been released. Brookings mentioned that.

Mr. FASCELL. I don't recall in the testimony yesterday that the Brookings people had any information that this ballistic submarine had visited Cienfuegos.

Mr. WALLNER. They did not, but that it visited Cuba.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, I don't know that we have to draw a distinction except I think we should. Cienfuegos is a submarine base. I think there is a lot of difference between visiting Havana and visiting Cienfuegos.

General FAURER. I think then our response should stand corrected. [Security deletion] that it visited Cuba has been made public.

Mr. FASCELL. What were the dates and locations of the visits by the subs and other vessels?

Lieutenant ROGERS. During the 11th deployment?

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Lieutenant ROGERS. On May 14 the group arrived in Havana. On May 15 the group transited the Yucatan Channel with the Golf-II ballistic sub. On May 17 the sub and surface group arrived at Cienfuegos. June 1 they departed Cienfuegos and transited the Windward Passage and exited the Caribbean on June 2.

Mr. FASCELL. I am trying to relate that to political activity in the United States during that period of time, if any. Wasn't that a period of time that Watergate came to a head, April or May this year?

Mr. WALLNER. There was May Day celebrations. I believe Watergate was certainly in the news at that time but I don't know of any direct relation.

Mr. FASCELL. Were the barges and a submarine tender in Cienfuegos at the time of the 11th deployment?

Lieutenant ROGERS. The barges in Cienfuegos?

Mr. FASCELL. And a subtender.

Mr. WALLNER. Barges have been there ever since they arrived. I don't recall the subtender.

Lieutenant ROGERS. There was no subtender. There was a merchant tanker but no subtender.

Mr. FASCELL. Was there any servicing of any kind during this deployment, either in Cienfuegos or any place else?

Mr. WALLNER. We have no positive proof that there was servicing of any kind but it is safe to presume they at least refueled from the tanker that accompanied them, both the surface combatants and the Golf-II. It is diesel powered, as you are aware.

Mr. FASCELL. During the 12th deployment did any submarines visit Cuban ports?

Lieutenant ROGERS. No.

Mr. FASCELL. Aside from deployments to Cuba, what other submarine activities have taken place in the Caribbean, if any?

Mr. WALLNER. That has been the extent of it, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. What is the significance of the aircraft deployments to Cuba? Are they related in anyway to ship deployments or anything else?

Lieutenant ROGERS. Sometimes they have been coincident with the ship deployments, but there are other times where the navy and the air deployments were not concurrent because there were 16 air deployments and only 12 naval deployments.

Mr. FASCELL. We can not read any pattern in this at all that has any significance?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. How long have the Soviets been deploying naval units to hemisphere ports outside of Cuba? What has their pattern been? Can you get that for the last 5 years or so?

Mr. WALLNER. We can supply that.¹ That is available. I was just trying to think to see if I could answer it. There have not been any combatants. It has been essentially the submarine tender training cruises. There was one in 1973.

Mr. FASCELL. It is my impression that has been generally the pattern.

Lieutenant ROGERS. Annual Pacific deployment.

Mr. FASCELL. You said with respect to replacement aircraft for Cuba it is the Mig-21 that is coming in.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Is there anything more sophisticated being deployed? Is there a Mig-23?

General FAURER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. There is. We finally established that.

Mr. WALLNER. We call it a Mig-23, but it is not in Cuba.

Mr. FASCELL. As I recall we could never decide whether there was a Mig-23 or if there was not; and, if there was one, where was it. We have decided now that there is a Mig-23 but not in Cuba.

¹ Subsequent to hearing, it was determined that this information was unable to be printed as part of publication due to its classified nature.

Mr. WALLNER. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. What is the capability of the Styx missile, and how many of them are there in Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. We estimate they have about [security deletion] in Cuba that are used on their Osa-1 guided-missile patrol boats and also on their Komar guided-missile patrol boats. It is a short-range [security deletion] antishipping with a maximum range I believe of about [security deletion] miles.

Mr. FASCELL. What kind of warhead does it carry?

Mr. WALLNER. High explosive.

Mr. FASCELL. No nuclears?

Mr. WALLNER. No nucs.

Mr. FASCELL. What is a Zhuk class boat, and how does it differ from Osa and Komar?

Mr. WALLNER. It is smaller and more lightly armed. It only has two antiaircraft weapons on it. [Security deletion.] It is, as I said, much smaller. It is used centrally for coastal patrol and we expect the Cubans will use it.

Mr. FASCELL. Is that a fast boat?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir, it is slower than the Osa and Komars.

Mr. FASCELL. How about Soviet military-civilian personnel in Cuba. How many are there and how does that differ from previous years, and what are they doing?

Mr. WALLNER. We are continuing to carry the same figures that we had last year for you, Mr. Chairman. I will give you a breakdown.

We estimate [security deletion] total Soviet personnel on the island of which [security deletion] we believe are in the Soviet "MAG" element in Cuba. The remaining [security deletion] are economic advisers, technicians principally in the nickel and sugar industries, as was mentioned in the presentation. [Security deletion] and they are trying to help pick up the nickel industry.

The military breakdown is very difficult to pinpoint except that we believe most of the advisers are in the service that have the more sophisticated systems, [security deletion].

Mr. FASCELL. Are there any Soviet or other nuclear weapons in Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir. We do not believe there are. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Is the persistent rumor or allegation with respect to caves still continuing or has that dropped off?

Mr. WALLNER. It has dropped off. [Security deletion] not anything like it was in the mid- to late-sixties when you could count on two or three a week. It is not that great now. Part of that, of course, is because there are not that many people coming out of Cuba any more.

Mr. FASCELL. Are the Cubans developing any nuclear capability of their own?

Mr. WALLNER. They have a reactor and they are using it for medical and limited industrial uses at the present time.

Mr. FASCELL. How did they acquire that?

Mr. WALLNER. It was from the Soviet Union. It was not built in Cuba. It is a small reactor, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Did we touch on sugar production?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir, we touched on it in the presentation. We have no firm figures on the most recent harvest. Most estimates place it over 6 million tons, probably as much as 6.2 million tons.

Mr. FASCELL. Is that their best effort?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir, that is not their best effort. Their best effort was in 1970 when over 8 million tons, 8.4 I believe, but as you recall they were shooting for 10 million that year.

Mr. FASCELL. I would just assume by this time that all sugar mill machinery has been switched from U.S. machinery to some other kind. Do we know whether that is true?

Mr. WALLNER. The vast majority of it probably is Soviet built. They have some Australian equipment. They have some Canadian equipment there. But it is still possible there might be small amounts of American stuff left that they managed to keep around.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you think the Cubans would want technical assistance from the United States in the sugar area? We heard about how they wanted assistance in cattle raising. Do they feel they could increase their sugar production with U.S. technical assistance?

Mr. WALLNER. I think they would want it, yes, sir, if they could get it on their terms. If I can refer to the Mexican oil deal as a brief analogy. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. The experimental election in Matanzas was a one party thing. It was not an election in the ordinary sense as we know it, was it?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir. There was no political party identified in the election. It was an individual election for delegates from the various echelons to this group.

Mr. FASCELL. Was it a slate kind of thing or was there opposition for the delegates' selection?

Mr. WALLNER. We are really not that familiar with how the mechanisms of it went. It is all coming to us from the Cuban press and it appears that at the various echelons, city, neighborhood, a meeting was called and the people that lived or worked in that area gathered, they made nominations of individuals to represent them and then they voted on the various names that were put forth.

Mr. FASCELL. And even if this were extended nationwide it is simply a management operation?

Mr. WALLNER. It seems to be that is what they are aiming at, better control, another echelon in the structure of the Cuban society.

Mr. FASCELL. Recently I have had the opportunity to talk to an Argentine senator who is on the "hit" list, and I have had a chance to talk to our Ambassador, and that is a predicate for raising the issue of the situation in Argentina, with respect to the possible threat of civil war.

Mr. WALLNER. I don't think there is a threat right now. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. I believe you testified that Cubans were involved in Syria.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. In the Middle East?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. They were actually in combat?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. One of your charts detailed the growth in Soviet and Eastern bloc country diplomatic missions to Latin America.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir. It was all Communist countries. It included the People's Republic of China and North Korea, that is right.

Mr. FASCELL. Is there any relationship between that growth and other activities, other than normal diplomatic activities? Do we have any evidence about the increase in espionage or anything like that?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir, we don't. [Security deletion.] They are not like they were in the late 1960's and the early 1970's.

General FAURER. I think one might observe that despite an occasional lapse there is greater circumspection being evidenced by the Soviets in their diplomatic and trade mission in the last year or two.

Mr. FASCELL. Mexico perhaps had an influence on that.

General FAURER. Mexico, I am sure, had an influence. I think perhaps Bolivia a few years ago.

Mr. WALLNER. Colombia recently.

Mr. FASCELL. When we discussed the probabilities of [security deletion]. Is that a generally held view with other agencies in the Government, other intelligence agencies?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir, it is.

Mr. FASCELL. That is a combined opinion?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes; that has been approved and coordinated with the Department of State.

General FAURER. I think it might be fair, though, to put that estimate in a very current context for the chairman by commenting that since it was put together and agreed to a very few weeks ago, [security deletion].

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir, that is true.

Mr. FASCELL. On my last visit in that general area I talked to both Peruvian and Ecuadorian military leaders. The Ecuadorians seemed to be more nervous than the Peruvians and the Chileans. I never was sure whether that was to support their request to us for modernization of their forces or whether that was a legitimate thing since they have no established borders except on the Pacific.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I think they are somewhat concerned about the recent oil fields and because of the undefined border with Peru they are concerned that Peru might want to also establish some claims in that area. However, there have been no overtures made there at all.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Finley reminded me that even their Pacific boundary is in dispute. I have forgotten the mileage now and the general character of the terrain along the northern Peruvian border with Ecuador but it is several hundred miles from there to the Texaco oil fields in Ecuador. Am I correct?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I am not sure. I believe that is it, at least.

Mr. FASCELL. And it is all jungle.

Mr. WALLNER. Undeveloped, yes sir.

Mr. FASCELL. I think I asked the military in Ecuador how they can conceivably think that Peruvian tanks could make it across all that and get up to the oil fields, and all they would tell me is that half the Peru-

vian tanks are painted green and the other half are painted yellow, and that the green ones are headed at them. I'm being facetious, of course.

As a matter of curiosity, though, do we know what the color of the tanks are?

Mr. WALLNER. In Ecuador, I don't.

Mr. FASCELL. In Peru.

Mr. WALLNER. They are a tan, a very light brown.

Mr. FASCELL. Is that the T-55? Is that the tank that has the rounded turret that you can stand 25 yards away from with an American tank and bounce shells off it without clobbering it?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Where does that tank fit in the scale of military capability? Is it old or new, good or bad, or obsolete?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. What is the newest Russian tank and what is its capability?

Mr. WALLNER. M-60.

General FAURER. Their's is the T-62. Ours is the M-60.

Mr. FASCELL. Is that a heavy tank?

General FAURER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. This is also a low silhouette tank with a capability that requires a guy 5 feet 4 or under to operate it. Americans can not get in it. Is that correct?

General FAURER. I don't know.

Mr. FASCELL. As I recall, some of our guys were upset about having to stand up to get shot at while they were lying down. [Laughter.]

How about Chile's military capability?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. We are talking now of land forces, sea forces, and air forces.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Modernization?

Mr. WALLNER. They are not as modern. [Security deletion.]

General FAURER. [Security deletion.] I am sure it has aged that much since and they are having that much more difficulty now.

Mr. FASCELL. Has their military efficiency been disturbed by virtue of the fact they have to run the government?

General FAURER. I don't believe it has.

Mr. FASCELL. How about political analysis on Chile? Is there any possibility that viable civilian rule could be restored to Chile within the framework of the old parties?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. On what do you base that estimate?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. I have certainly gotten that same impression talking to political leaders from Chile, opposition leaders in Chile, and from the military themselves. Estimates range anywhere from 5 to 15 years, or forever.

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

General FAURER. Without overdoing the analogy, I would suggest there have been other military regimes who have embarked on a sincere intention to put the house in order before putting it back in civil-

ian rule and have tired of the task and allowed it to go back to civilian. Argentina being an example.

Mr. FASCELL. What do the Cubans use the Isle of Pines for?

Mr. WALLNER. They call it the Isle of Youth, Mr. Chairman, and they are attempting to develop an agricultural base there. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Do we have any evidence of any activity on the southern shore of the Isle of Pines. As I recall, the water there drops sharply to 800 fathoms or better.

Mr. WALLNER. It is very deep. I don't recall the exact figures but off the southern part of the Isle of Pines it does drop off fast. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. The Golf class sub centered Cuba on May 7—and departed on May 30.

Lieutenant ROGERS. June 2. On the 11th deployment.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Lieutenant ROGERS. They departed the Caribbean on June 2 and they departed Cienfuegos on June 1.

Mr. FASCELL. And it was in the area from May 7?

Lieutenant ROGERS. From the 14th. They came to Havana on the 14th.

Mr. FASCELL. Of May?

Lieutenant ROGERS. Of May, right.

Mr. FASCELL. What did it do during that intervening period of time? I'm not clear on that.

Lieutenant ROGERS. They conducted combined exercises with the Cubans. ASW exercises and [security deletion] on the 6th, 8th, 10th, and 14th of May.

Mr. FASCELL. In the Caribbean?

Lieutenant ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Was that the loop thing I saw on the chart?

Lieutenant ROGERS. No, sir. That was showing the Krestas.

Mr. FASCELL. That was something else.

So they continued joint military activity with the Cubans?

Lieutenant ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. And came back to Havana?

Lieutenant ROGERS. Right. Then when they were finished on the 14th they transitted to Cienfuegos.

Mr. FASCELL. How long did they stay there?

Lieutenant ROGERS. Until the first of June. They arrived in Cienfuegos on the 17th and departed on the first of June.

General FAURER. ASW activities were continued prior to coming to Havana.

Mr. FASCELL. So during the latter part of May they were in Cienfuegos, up until the time they departed.

Mr. WALLNER. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. So did they use a hotel or what happened? What did they do?

Mr. WALLNER. Their hotel there is not complete.

Mr. FASCELL. The last time I recall they had completed a barracks and messhall and a whole bunch of other things, and a soccer field. Was the crew out? Was this just R & R, or what?

Mr. WALLNER. Probably. We have no firm reports but that is a safe assumption. They used the barracks and recreational facilities of Alcatraz. They refueled and departed the end of the month.

Mr. FASCELL. How do we keep up with all this activity? [Security deletion.]

General FAURER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. [Security deletion.]

Mr. WALLNER. No. I don't remember, sir.

Mr. McCLELLAN. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. [Security deletion] the sub was in Cienfuegos, and that is all we know. The barges were there. There is no tender, no evidence of what the men were doing, or anything else, for that matter.

Mr. WALLNER. No.

Mr. FASCELL. Where was the sub moored? At one of the moorings or up alongside the dock?

Lieutenant ROGERS. I don't have that information with me.

General FAURER. That could be obtained.

Mr. FASCELL. It is not significant except—

Mr. WALLNER. I don't recall if it was in the harbor or in the four-point mooring near Alcatraz.

Mr. FASCELL. If it is at the mooring, for example, how do you get the men off?

Mr. WALLNER. Light Cuban lighters.

Mr. FASCELL. So there is some kind of ongoing activities. The Cuban naval base is at one end of that thing.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Am I correct then in the assumption that they have Cuban logistical support, at least in terms of lighter movements of men, et cetera?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

General FAURER. I don't know how many hairs you want to split. I guess there could be a Soviet lighter there.

Mr. FASCELL. I am just trying to find out how they operate in Cienfuegos if it is not a base. I am still trying to understand what an understanding is that is supposed to exist between the United States and Russia. I have never really understood it.

General FAURER. Let's establish for you and provide you what reconnaissance took place during that time and what is specifically provided.²

Mr. FASCELL. I think that would be helpful. I am not sure it will lead to any conclusion one way or the other.

Did we discuss the capabilities of the Echo-II subs, or exactly what the SS-N-5 missile capability is.

Lieutenant ROGERS. That is a ballistic missile that has a range of 700 nautical miles.

Mr. WALLNER. That is not on the Echo-II, that is on the Golf.

Mr. FASCELL. And we established that has an HE warhead.

Mr. WALLNER. No. Potentially it can carry a nuclear warhead. The Styx missile is the other.

² Data subsequently provided and due to security classification the document is maintained in the committee files.

Mr. FASCELL. What about the Echo-II sub? How is that different?

Lieutenant ROGERS. The Echo has eight SS-N-3 missiles that have a range of [security deletion] nautical miles.

Mr. FASCELL. And they are ballistic missiles with nuclear warhead?

Lieutenant ROGERS. They are cruise missiles.

Mr. FASCELL. What does that mean?

Lieutenant ROGERS. They have surface-to-surface capability different from a ballistic missile, which would have land targets.

Mr. FASCELL. Do we know if there are nuclear warheads in the Soviet ballistic subs visiting Cuba?


General FAURER. The answer—do we know? I am sure we do not know [security deletion].

Mr. FASCELL. Just in case.

Mr. WALLNER. We don't know for sure. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. I have exhausted my series of questions and I want to thank you all very much for taking the time for the presentation and answering the questions. You have been very cooperative and helpful. Thank you very much.

[The subcommittee was adjourned at 11:45 a.m.]



APPENDIX

ARTICLE FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES, OCTOBER 22, 1974, ENTITLED
"U.S. POLICY AND SOVIET SUBS" BY BARRY M. BLECHMAN AND
STEPHANIE E. LEVINSON¹

WASHINGTON.—Today marks the twelfth anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis. At its conclusion, in 1962, the Soviet Union conceded that it would no longer deploy strategic offensive weapons in Cuba.

Eight years later, in September, 1970, after renewed tensions, this commitment was broadened to disallow the servicing of submarines from Cuban ports.

Yet, last April, a Soviet Golf-class—this is in Atlantic alliance designation—diesel-powered strategic missile submarine visited Havana. No confrontation ensued this time. What happened to bring about this change? And what implications can be drawn from this incident for United States policy?

There is no question that in 1970 the Soviet Union built a facility for servicing submarines at the Cuban port of Cienfuegos. That construction work included barracks, recreational facilities, a water tower, rehabilitation of an existing pier, and the sinking of moorings for visiting submarines.

Also, two barges associated exclusively with the disposal of effluents from nuclear-power plants, were brought to the port. All these facilities still remain. All that is necessary to make use of the base is the arrival of a submarine and a tender.

As a result of United States protests, Soviet plans to operate from the port were shelved, at least temporarily. An understanding was reached in 1970 defining what the Soviet Union would and would not do with respect to the basing of naval vessels in Cuba. But this agreement remains secret to all but a handful of officials. Furthermore, the official United States interpretation of the agreement seems to have narrowed.

Initially, United States concern over the Cienfuegos facilities was directed at preventing the Soviet Union from basing strategic missile submarines in the Western Hemisphere. In this sense, the understanding was viewed as an extension of the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement on nondeployment of strategic weapons in Cuba.

In the face of recent visits by the Golf-class submarine, the understanding is now interpreted to apply only to nuclear-powered vessels.

The Defense Department's current position is summarized in a statement by former President Nixon in January, 1971, that "in the event that nuclear subs were serviced in either Cuba, or from Cuba, that would be a violation of the understanding."

If, in fact this was an accurate description of the agreement, it was violated in February, 1971. That month, a nuclear-powered November-class submarine with a tender visited Cienfuegos. Whether the submarine actually was serviced in the port remains a moot point, but there were no United States protests. Nor did the United States protest subsequent visits by Echo-class submarines—nuclear-powered vessels carrying tactical missiles.

It seems evident that the Soviet Union has been probing the margins of the 1970 understanding. It has done the following, in this order: put a nuclear-powered attack submarine into Cienfuegos with a tender, put a nuclear-powered tactical missile submarine into Cienfuegos with a tender, put a diesel-powered strategic missile submarine into a different Cuban port quietly, and put a diesel-powered strategic missile submarine into a different Cuban port publicly. This is just what may be learned from the public record.

¹ Barry M. Blechman and Stephanie E. Levinson are staff members of the foreign policy studies program at the Brookings Institution.

The ramifications of this activity should not be overstated. The Soviet Union has not, as yet, challenged the understanding directly, by for example sending a Yankee-class nuclear-powered strategic submarine into Cienfuegos.

Nonetheless, it seems clear that the Soviet Union is gradually but deliberately encroaching upon the agreement.

Since the military advantages that would result from the establishment of a submarine base in Cuba are not commensurate with the risk of provoking a strong political response by the United States, Soviet motives must be more complex.

In effect, the submarine visits provide a test of United States willingness to take risks in its broad relations with the Soviet Union in order to prevent a shift in the two sides' relative military capabilities.

If this indeed is the Russians' purpose, then the United States response to the visits—essentially an endorsement of the Russians' conduct—can only encourage similar future actions.

Thus, the series of submarine visits to Cuba poses a political challenge for United States foreign policy.

More important, if this Soviet tactic is successful over the long-term, United States reluctance to insist on compliance with the accord could help bring into question its credibility in world affairs. The implication of this assessment is that the United States should adopt a firm attitude toward Soviet submarine activity in the Caribbean.

This does not mean that all operations should become a cause célèbre. It would be difficult to balk at those types of visits for which the Soviet Union has established precedents.

New steps, however such as the servicing of a Golf-class sub in Cienfuegos, should stir a strong reaction. Only by demonstrating a willingness to make issues of single events that in isolation appear relatively insignificant can the United States cause the Soviet Union to understand that normalizing our relations requires mutual concessions.

ARTICLE FROM THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, DECEMBER 16, 1974, ENTITLED "SWEETER TIMES: CUBAN ECONOMY GETS MOVING, FINALLY; PLANS SET FOR MORE GROWTH" BY JOHN E. COONEY.

ALAMAR, Cuba—Miguel Camejo never had it so good.

A mechanic at a nearby oil refinery, he lives with his wife and four children atop a modern, four-story apartment building in this Havana suburb. He owns a 23-inch Soviet-made television (\$750) and radio (\$200), a Cuban refrigerator (\$650) and a four-burner gas range (\$85). Pressing beers on visitors, Mr. Camejo says: "Everyone should live as well as the Cuban people."

Or maybe the Cuban people should live as well as Mr. Camejo, for he is hardly your typical worker. His cornucopia of consumer goodies exists in recognition of his industriousness. Because he works hard, puts in overtime cheerfully and spends Sundays in grueling volunteer labor like cutting sugarcane, he and others like him fall into a category of "exemplary revolutionary workers." They get the first crack at the best housing and luxuries that increasingly are becoming available to Cuba. "If everyone worked like Camejo," an official says, "the economy would be even better."

AN 8 PERCENT GROWTH RATE

Offering material incentives instead of moral exhortations is just one of the steps that have been taken to bolster Cuba's long-troubled economy. The Communist government is imposing production-cost analyses on industry. It is modernizing transport. It is beefing up exports. It is diversifying manufacturing to become less dependent on imports. With all this, plus rising prices on sugar, minerals and other major exports, and massive Soviet assistance, Cuba's economy apparently has stopped foundering for the first time since Fidel Castro seized power 15 years ago.

"The economy shows a very satisfactory situation in which there is a combined high sustained growth along with favorable marketing of our products for export," Raul Leon Tovras, recently appointed president of the National Bank of Cuba, says in an interview.

According to the Cuban figures, which Western analysts consider realistic, the economy grew 26% between 1970 and 1973. This 8% yearly growth rate is expected to continue through 1975. Officials think the average gain in output for the next 10 years will hit 6% a year. Since prerevolutionary 1958, Cuba's per-capita output of goods and services has tripled to nearly \$1,000 a year, the highest in Latin America with the possible exception of Venezuela's.

The price of sugar has had as much to do with this as anything else. Sugar for export now fetches 53 cents a pound, up from 8 to 14 cents just last year and 2 to 3 cents four years ago. If this season's crop nears last year's six million tons, it will boost total economic output by an estimated \$2 billion. Higher prices on other exports, such as nickel, citrus, tobacco and fish, also are helping.

NEW GLAMOUR AT THE TROPICANA

Cuba is spending its cash eagerly. It just bought 35 large-tonnage freighters from capitalist and socialist nations. Trade missions from Latin America, Japan and Western and Eastern Europe are pouring into Havana to sell freezing plants, port equipment and just about anything else. The first of 9,000 Fords and Chevrolets ordered in a \$25 million deal with the Argentine subsidiaries of U.S. companies now are on Havana's streets. On the docks, longshoremen are unloading sophisticated medical gear from Sweden, flatbed trucks from Czechoslovakia and cane harvesters from East Germany.

And at the Tropicana nightclub, old Cuba hands say, chorus girls are performing in new and glamorous costumes for the first time in years.

"Now the Cubans don't just want to buy a product," a Western diplomat says. "They want a factory so they can make it here." To bolster self-sufficiency, some

people think, Cuba would like to buy certain high technology from the U.S.: agricultural and computer gear, for example. But banker Leon says, "None of our plans are taking into consideration trade with the U.S."

"Communism is not in disagreement with high technology," says Ramon Castro, Fidel's older brother and a high-level administrator. "But," he says in an interview, "we prefer not to have things if they are accompanied by bad intentions."

Otherwise, Cuba's foreign trade is expected to keep expanding. "The economy is good now," says another diplomat. "The difference between what it was like here in 1970 and now is like night and day."

SOME 100,000 "LAZY BIRDS"

Indeed, 1970 marked a nadir. Cuba then failed to reach its much-publicized target of 10 million tons of sugar. Though it did harvest a record 8.5 million tons, the shortfall was a national trauma. The harvest dragged down output in most every other industry because massive numbers of workers had been diverted to cutting cane. When Premier Castro acknowledged the harvest's failure, morale fell and job absenteeism soared.

It got so bad that the government in 1971 enacted an "antiloafing" law with a maximum punishment of two years at a work farm for able-bodied men between 17 and 60 who failed to stay on the job. At the time, some 100,000 "mongollones," or "lazy birds," straggled forward to take work.

"Next to the October (1962) missile crisis," a Cuban official says, "the 1970 sugar effort may have affected Cuba more than any other event since the revolution."

Even before 1970, the economy was none too productive. Some 600,000 people, many of them skilled managers, professionals and technicians, had fled the country. Trade embargoes by the U.S. and much of Latin America had a devastating effect. Most Cuban machinery had depended on American parts to function.

Neither Mr. Castro nor his chief subordinates knew much about economic matters. "They weren't typical leaders of a Latin revolution, one elite replacing another for their own gain," a diplomat says. "They didn't have any idea at all about running things, let alone changing the economy to a socialist one."

The government's priorities were costly. It neglected the beef export business to raise unprofitable dairy cattle to provide fresh milk for the population. It poured massive amounts of money into free social services, such as health care and education. Though Cuba now has the highest literacy rate and the best medical care in Latin America, its programs were expensive and took years to pay dividends.

Mismanagement took its toll. Che Guevara's early attempts to industrialize the country failed. They were abandoned in favor of boosting sugar output, and it fell. Some imported technology proved a liability. A Polish canning factory, for example, required 270 employees for the same output that a Western-designed factory could achieve with 25, and labor was scarce.

Even now, food, clothing, soap and toothpaste, along with most other consumer necessities, are rationed. Supplies, though, are beginning to increase. Rationed, four packs of cigarettes a week cost 20 cents a pack; extra packs cost about \$1.90 each. Meat now appears on dinner tables once or twice a week, up from once or twice a month. Some foods, such as fish and ice cream, are unrationed. Rum has been unrationed since 1971, but it costs \$13 to \$20 a bottle. Other readily accessible items are record albums at \$12; Soviet cameras, \$125 to \$500, and portable radios, \$125.

Cuba was practically forced to make such goods available. Rents have been kept under 10% of monthly wages. Health care, education and sports events are free. Tickets to movies and plays cost a maximum of \$1.20 each. As a consequence, Cubans have had a lot of cash and, until recently, little to spend it on. When cash in the public's hands rose to some \$3 billion a few years back, the government began to worry that people would simply knock off work for a year or so and live on their savings.

In economic circles today, the catchwords appear to be planning, caution and Soviet assistance. "In the plans we are now making, we are being very cautious," Mr. Leon says. "They are without adventurous predictions. Now plans are being coordinated for the next five years between Cuba and the Soviet Union."

Soviet thinking shows up in Cuba's first five-year plan, covering 1976-1980. It calls for "substantial improvement" in the production of sugar, energy, paper and cardboard, food and automotive parts and in the fish catch. It also calls for

new manufactures, especially in textiles. A major effort is underway to increase nickel production. Cuba has 24% of the world's known deposits. Much of a \$300 million Soviet credit line will be drawn down to update and expand two nickel plants and build another one.

Under the plan, Cuba will be able to process another 30,000 tons a year for export. The country sold 37,000 tons in 1972 and 14,800 tons in 1958, according to official figures. In a speech last year, Mr. Castro foresaw additional nickel plants to raise the export figure by another 60,000 tons and the capital investment in the nickel industry to \$600 million. He figured this would increase Cuba's export income by some \$400 million.

The citrus industry has expanded. Tourism is on a tentative rebound. Some 50,000 visitors from Western Europe, Canada and socialist countries are expected next year, up from 15,000 this year. In the works are half a dozen hotels in the picturesque area around Cienfuegos along the south coast and expanded accommodations at Varadero, a northern vacation spot 75 miles west of Havana. In contrast to prerevolutionary days, an official says, "people come now for our weather and beaches, not for gambling and other vices."

A Canadian businessman checking out Varadero, however, has some complaints. "Mr. and Mrs. Brown from Toronto want their orange juice to look like orange juice," he says, pointing to a pinkish-orange liquid. "And these menus will have to be in English. Nobody in Canada knows Spanish."

These may be plans for English menus, for Cuba has become a land of planners. There are plans for modernizing the nation's ports. Plans for building industrial cities, such as one at Nuevitas on the north coast and another near Cienfuegos, where there are cement, fertilizer and grain-processing plants and a huge sugar warehouse to service foreign ships. Plans for more schools, hospitals and housing and for a series of fish-freezing plants stretching from Havana to Santiago. Plans to redevelop Old Havana, which looks as if it is crumbling into the harbor.

"Cuba has more plans than it has cement or people to carry them out," an official acknowledges.

Cuba will have to rely on continued Russian help if its plans are to work. Economically, the country has tied itself to the Soviet Union for at least another 10 years. At the end of 1972, the Russians agreed to postpone repayment of Cuba's \$5 billion debt until 1986, meanwhile offering the \$300-million credit line for the nickel and other industries. Also in 1972, Cuba became a full member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, a socialist organization akin to the European Economic Community. Russian economic planners, engineers and technicians are still at work throughout Cuba.

The Soviet Union has kept supplying Cuba with \$5-a-barrel oil at a cost of some \$1.5 million a day. Though the two nations have a joint venture to drill for offshore Cuban oil, it has met with little success.

When commodity prices were low, the Russians agreed to buy Cuban sugar at 11 cents a pound, twice the going world price, and nickel for \$5,000 a ton, nearly twice the free-market price. About half of Cuba's exports still go to socialist nations, though world prices have risen. "The Soviet Union has given us diverse and generous help, and our people will never forget it," Mr. Leon of the National Bank says. A Western analyst observes, "It has taken 15 years and a hell of a lot of help, but Cuba's system is on the verge of working, and it appears to be with us for an awfully long time to come."

THE HISTORY OF THE
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